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TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 
Appellant Shayne Clayson petitions this court to reverse the erroneous 
judgment that resulted from a erroneous ruling by the trial court in granting a 
Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
and Utah Railway Company against Shayne Clayson. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2)(h). The order appealed from is a final order disposing of 
all claims of all parties. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court commit an error of law in deciding that there is no issue of 
fact in an FELA case where there is disputed testimony and issues of fact raised by 
the testimony and documentary evidence in this case? 
Did the trial court commit an error of law in deciding that there is no issue of 
fact against Utah Railway Company and Union Pacific Railroad Company when 
the railroads failed to use ordinary care for the safety of its employee? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the 
appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions for correctness and to 
determine weather there has been an error of law, without according deference to 
«•>»* trial court's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 751 P.2d 248 
(Utah Ct App. 1988); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative statutory provision for this appeal is 45 U.S.C. §51 et 
seq. Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal for the reversible error of the trial court granting a Motion 
for Summary Judgment in favor of The Union Pacific Railroad Company 
("UPRR") and Utah Railway Company ("Utah") against Shayne Clayson 
("Clayson"). 
This is a Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) case against Union 
Pacific Railroad. Mr. Clayson was employed as an employee of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company ("Union Pacific") working in the course and scope of 
employment as a signal maintainer when he sustained serious bodily injuries while 
he was repairing a Union Pacific crossing and was struck by a Utah Railway 
Company ("Utah") train. Utah was a permissive user of the track under a written 
Track Agreement with the Union Pacific which gave track rights to operate 
locomotives on Union Pacific track in the area that Plaintiff was injured. 
Mr. Clayson sued his employer, The Union Pacific under the FELA in Salt 
Lake City, Utah for the damages he sustained as a result of these serious 
debilitating injuries. Mr. Clayson further sued Utah as a result of common law 
negligence against Utah for the negligent operation of the locomotive which struck 
Plaintiff. Mr. Clayson's case was originally assigned to the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, but the Honorable Judge Frederick recused himself and the case was 
assigned to the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto. 
Mr. Clayson appeals from the trial courts granting of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Mr. Clayson contends that the court committed reversible 
error as a matter of law when it granted Union Pacific's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on an FELA case when there were issues of fact raised by the testimony 
of numerous witnesses in the records of this case. 
Mr. Clayson further appeals from the trial court granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against Utah Railway Company when there were 
issues of fact raised by the testimony of numerous witnesses in the records of this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Parties. The appellant lived in Salt Lake City, Utah with his wife and 
three children at the time of his injuries on December 4, 2000. Appellant currently 
resides in Utah by himself, and has worked for Appellee Union Pacific Railroad as 
a signal maintainer in Salt Lake City, Utah and Omaha, Nebraska. Union Pacific 
Railroad has a railroad yard in Salt Lake City, Utah and conducts business in Utah. 
Appellee Utah Railway Company is a permissive user of the Union Pacific track 
and conducts business in Utah. 
2. Clayson's Employment at Union Pacific Railroad. After graduating from 
high school in 1987 at Granger High in Salt Lake City, Utah, Mr. Clayson had a 
variety of jobs until he commenced his employment with the Union Pacific 
Railroad on January 9, 1989 in the Signal Department. He has worked for the 
Union Pacific Railroad from January 1981 until the date of his injury on December 
4, 2000. Mr. Clayson commenced his employment as a signal maintainer in the 
Salt Lake City area and worked that position until he transferred to Omaha, 
Nebraska in 1994 drafting maps. Mr. Clayson remained in Omaha until May 2000 
when he exercised his senority and returned as a signal maintainer in the Salt Lake 
City area. It was during this time that he was seriously injured on December 4, 
2000. 
3. Clavson's Injury of December 4, 2000. Clayson received significant 
physical injuries when he was struck by a Utah locomotive being operated by Utah 
Railway employees while he was attempting to make a repair of a signal 
malfunction at the 17th Street North Crossing in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the time 
of Clayson's injury, he was performing the duties of a signal maintainer by himself 
for the Union Pacific Railroad. Mr. Clayson was ordered to the crossing by his 
supervisor Mr. Ron Nash where it was reported that the signal gates were 
malfunctioning in the activated position with no trains approaching. When 
Clayson arrived at the 17th Street North Crossing, he complied with a UP safety 
requirement of completing a Lone Worker Permit prior to commencing work on 
the crossing. The readings that Mr. Clayson obtained were not consistent with the 
physical findings, so he contacted his supervisor, Mr. Ron Nash by cell phone. It 
was while he was troubleshooting the crossing that he was struck by a Utah 
Railway train which did not issue any warnings by blowing its horn or whistle 
prior to striking Clayson. The failure of the train crew to blow its horn, is in 
violation of General Code of Operating Rules 5.8.2 Sounding Whistle. 
4. Utah Railway's Use of Union Pacific Track. Utah Railway Company was 
a permissible user of the Union Pacific track by virtue of a Trackage Right 
Agreement which allows Utah to operate its trains on Union Pacific property. The 
first question of fact was whether the crew of Utah train RUT311 should have been 
informed of the malfunctioning signals at the 17th Street North Crossing prior to 
reaching the location of the malfunction. As per the testimony of the conductor 
Steve Clifton, the crew had not been informed of the signal malfunction at this 
crossing (5:17), and he had not received notice from the dispatcher that a signal 
maintainer was working in this area (5:43). Signal Operations and Manager of 
Signal Maintenance Ron Nash, had notified Mr. Clayson of the malfunction of the 
signals at grade crossing 17th Street North at approximately 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. on 
the day of the accident. However, according to the taped conversation between the 
dispatcher and the crew of Utah RUT311, the train crew was notified of 
malfunctioning block red light signals at control points 786 and 787 on either side 
of the location of the accident. The crew was not notified of the crossing signal 
malfunction between the signals at approximately MP 786.5, (where the accident 
occurred) even though maintainer Clayson had informed the dispatcher of 
problems with the crossing as well as problems with signals at both ends of the 
crossing (18.11). Mr. Clayson had also informed his supervisor Ron Nash of the 
malfunction of the crossing signals (18.10). Because both Signal Operations and 
Manager of Signal Maintenance Ron Nash were aware of a problem with the 
crossing signals at grade crossing at 17th North (17:12), they were required to 
inform the dispatcher of this situation so that affected trains could be notified. Had 
the train crew been informed that the crossing signals were malfunctioning, they 
would have had a duty to stop and flag the crossing (send a flagman to walk the 
train through the crossing) in violation with General Code of Operating Rules 
632.2 A. and Federal Regulation, 49 CFR 234.107 whereby the accident would 
have been avoided. 
5. Utah Railway's Failure to Warn. The Utah Railway locomotive's audible 
warning device was not used as required to warn Mr. Clayson of the approaching 
train. Several witnesses testified that they did not hear any audible warning sounds 
from either the train or the crossing arms at the time the train impacted with 
Plaintiff, nor at any time prior thereto. Further the engineer's event recorder or 
black box did not indicate that the horn was blown prior to arriving at the crossing. 
This by itself confirmed the absence of the horn being used as required by federal 
regulations. These facts alone establish a basis of negligence against the crew 
operating the train at the time of the accident, and clearly warrant a finding that a 
question of fact exists for which a jury should decide. 
Rebecca Cook was a passenger in an automobile being driven by her 
husband. At the time of the incident they were the first car stopped at the crossing 
on the east side as the train in question approached, just prior to striking Mr. 
Clayson. She observed the Plaintiff straddling the track with his back to the train 
in a bent over position. (See p. 23,1. 19-25 Plaintiffs Exhibit "3", Deposition of 
Rebecca Cook.) She testified that she did not hear a bell nor any warning given 
by the train of its approach. She believed that had the train given some kind of 
audible warning, she would have heard it. (See p. 25,1. 6-14. Plaintiffs Exhibit 
"3", Deposition of Rebecca Cook) Mrs. Cook was stopped at the crossing because 
of the malfunctioning gates and was waiting for a train to clear before proceeding 
over the crossing. She was actively waiting and listening for the train since she 
could not proceed until the train passed. Not only was her vision unimpaired, but 
she was consciously listening for an approaching train since the crossing signals 
were in a down position. This was likewise true for her husband Rhett Cook who 
was also in the same vehicle. 
Rhett Cook, Rebecca Cook's husband, testified that he was sitting in the 
driver's seat of their car and he did not hear a train horn, nor did he hear any bells 
from the crossing signal. (See p. 16,1.14-23. Plaintiffs Exhibit "4", Deposition of 
Rhett Cook) 
Ron Nash, Plaintiffs supervisor was talking with the Plaintiff by phone at 
the time he was struck by the train. Mr. Nash testified that he had no problems 
hearing the Plaintiff. They were talking when suddenly the phone went dead as a 
result of the accident. Prior to the accident, Mr. Nash testified that he had no 
problem hearing the Plaintiff. Had the train whistle been blowing at such close 
range, it would have interfered with his ability to hear Mr. Clayson. (See p. 59,1. 
4-13, Plaintiffs Exhibit "5" Deposition of Ron Nash) 
Einor Paulson, electrician for the Union Pacific Railroad Company, testified 
that he was working approximately 50 feet from Plaintiff at the time of the 
accident. He observed the train in question moving at a very slow speed and come 
to a stop after hitting the Plaintiff. He did not hear the train coming, and 
emphatically testified that the train was not blowing its horn. (See p. 43,1. 1-17, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit "6", Deposition of Einor Paulson.) He further testified that he 
should have been able to hear the train if the horn were blowing. 
6. The Requirement to Operate at Restricted Speed. The train was not 
operated at the required speed for the conditions. Had the train crew been given an 
XH Order (protective order) from the UP Dispatcher as required by 49 C.F.R. 
234.107, the train crew was required to operate at Restricted Speed, and should be 
prepared to stop within half the range of vision of any impediment or person. 
However the engineer did not stop as required, resulting in the impact with Mr. 
Clayson. 
Engineer Chad Booth testified that the train in question was being operated 
at a speed of 17-20 mph., a speed that exceeds the restricted speed of 15 mph. (See 
p. 43,1. 16-17, Plaintiffs Exhibit "7" Deposition of Chad Booth.) 
7. The Requirement of Union Pacific Railroad Dispatcher to Issue 
Protective Orders. Train Dispatcher Carl Steiger did not properly perform his 
duties to inform Utah train RUT311 of conditions ahead, issuing an XH Protective 
Order (Order regarding special caution when there is an adverse condition ahead.) 
In fact, no notice was given to the train crew of the existence of the Plaintiff as 
required. Steve Clifton, Conductor for Utah Railway testified that the dispatcher 
should have notified the crew of the existence of a defective signal and crossing. 
(See p. 21,1. 1-8, Plaintiffs Exhibit "8", Deposition of Steve Clifton.) The failure 
to inform the crew of that fact was a violation of the railroad's own safety rules. 
(See p. 27, 1. 1-4, Plaintiffs Exhibit "8", Deposition of Steve Clifton.) Terry 
Miller, Senior Manager of Signal Operations for the Union Pacific Railroad, 
testified that it is the requirement of the railroad to comply with FRA (Federal 
Railroad Administration) rules and regulations and to issue either XG or XH 
(protective) Order in situations involving malfunctioning crossing warning 
systems. Such an order mandates that the train crew reduce their speed to no 
greater than 15 mph. No such order was given on the occasion in question. (See p. 
45-48, Plaintiffs Exhibit "9", Deposition of Terry Miller.) 
8. Union Pacific's Failure to Train Shavne Clavson. Shayne Clayson was 
not provided with the training that he had requested in order to perform his duties 
in the safest manner. These unreasonably dangerous conditions, failures, and 
associated negligent acts of commission or omission on the part of Defendant 
created an unsafe work place for Plaintiff. Id. 
Ralph Smith, Maintenance Foreman for the Union Pacific Railroad at the 
time of Plaintiffs injury, testified that the Grant Tower area where Plaintiff was 
working at the time of his injury was a very complex area for maintainers. Given 
the complexity, Mr. Smith opined that the one week of training given Plaintiff was 
an inadequate training period from a safety standpoint. (See p. 35,1. 24-24 to p. 
36,1. 1 -16, Plaintiffs Exhibit" 10", Deposition of Ralph Smith.) 
Plaintiffs injury was caused due to the unreasonably dangerous conditions 
of Plaintiffs work place and the failures and associated negligent acts of 
commission or omission on the part of the Defendants. The combination of 
Defendant's crew not being informed of malfunctioning signals; failure to use the 
audible warning device to warn Mr. Clayson of the approaching train; not 
operating the train at a restricted speed for the conditions; the train dispatcher's 
failure to inform Utah train RUT311 of the conditions ahead and the lack of 
training Plaintiff had requested to perform his duties in the safest manner, all 
created the unsafe condition that existed at the time and place of Plaintiff s injury. 
Plaintiffs expert Charles Culver, expressed an opinion that Plaintiffs injury 
was caused due to unreasonably dangerous conditions of Plaintiff s work place and 
the failures and associated negligent acts of commission or omission on the part of 
the Defendant. (Plaintiffs Exhibit "1", Affidavit of Charles Culver). Plaintiffs 
expert found that 1) Defendant's crew had not being informed of malfunctioning 
signals 2) failed to use the audible warning device to warn Mr. Clayson of the 
approaching train 3) did not operating the train at the restricted speed for the 
conditions which existed 4) the train dispatcher's failed to inform Utah train 
RUT311 of the conditions ahead and 5) Mr. Clayson was not provided the training 
he had requested to perform his duties in the safest manner which created an 
unsafe condition at the time and place of Plaintiff s injury. (Plaintiffs Exhibit "1", 
Affidavit of Charles Culver). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment should be granted only when the evidence, considered 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, that a question of fact has not been 
raised by the pleadings, deposition testimony, and affidavits on file herein. In the 
case before this court numerous questions of fact have been raised by the 
deposition testimony and affidavit of appellant's expert witness Charles Culver, 
attached hereto, marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit "1". Statutory violations have been 
raised pertaining to the train crews violation of 49 CFR 241.107 when the train 
crew failed to operate the Utah train at restricted speed and further failed to warn 
Mr. Clayson by sounding its horn which is confirmed by the event recorder (black 
box) and testimony of five witnesses. Further question of fact has been raised by 
the failure of the Union Pacific Railroad Company's dispatcher's failure to place 
protective orders (XH) to protect the crossing when there is a known malfunction. 
See 49 CFR 234.107. 
The standard of review in an FELA case is that the railroad employee is to 
be given every doubt before the court, and that a right to a jury trial on the 
questions of whether the defendant's negligence which caused plaintiffs injury is 
viewed as an integral part of the remedy congress fashioned for railroad 
employees. Bailey vs. Central Virginia Railroad Co., 319 U.S. 350 (1943). The 
U. S. Supreme Court in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 
500, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957) has further reaffirmed that the clear congressional intent 
was that railroad related cases should be submitted to juries for resolution. 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that four elements are necessary in 
order to establish a prima facie case under the FELA. The four elements are 1) the 
injured employee was injured while in the scope of his employment 2) the 
employee's employment was in the furtherance of the railroad's interstate 
transportation business; 3) the employer was negligent; and 4) the employer's 
negligence played some part in causing the injury for which compensation is 
sought under FELA. See Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 763 F. 2d 805, 808 (6th 
Cir. 1985). The facts in this case established through the pleadings, the deposition 
testimony and affidavit on file, clearly shows that appellant has met this burden, 
and that summary judgment should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The trial court committed reversible error as a matter of law when it granted 
Union Pacific Railroad Company and Utah Railway Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
A Summary Judgment is an extreme and drastic remedy which should only 
be allowed if there are no genuine issues of fact requiring a trial, a question of fact 
exists when fair-minded people could reach different conclusions on issues in 
controversy. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When evaluating 
a motion for summary judgment, "a court must consider all of the facts and 
evidence presented, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom, in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 
405, 408 (Utah App. 1987). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law, we review the trial court's ruling with no deference. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). In the case before this court, 
numerous fact questions have been raised by the depositions taken (12) and 
affidavit on file in this case. Questions of fact were raised pertaining to the train 
crew's violation of 49 C.F.R. 234.107 when the crew failed to operate the train at 
restricted speed and failed to warn Mr. Clayson by sounding its horn which was 
documented on the event recorder (black box) and testimony of five witnesses. 
Further question of fact was raised by the failure of the UP dispatcher to issue 
protective orders (XH Order) to protect the crossing when there is a known 
malfunction. (49 C.F.R. 234.107) 
POINT II. 
The trial court committed reversible error, when after viewing the testimony 
of the parties, granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Plaintiff Shayne Clayson on the issue of liability in an Federal Employer's 
Liability Act (FELA) case. 
The FELA represents a legislative departure from the principles of the 
common law motivated by "the special needs of railroad workers who are daily 
exposed to the risks inherent in railroad work and are helpless to provide 
adequately for their own safety." Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 
329,78 S.Ct. 758,762 (1958). The statute reflects a legislative recognition that the 
cost of human injury is an unavoidable expense of railroading, which must be 
borne by someone, and it has to be adjusted equitably between the worker and the 
carrier. Id. Because the Act is remedial in nature, it should be liberally construed 
to effectuate its purposes. Kulavic v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co., 1 
F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 1993). See, also, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 
352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957). 
In a FELA case, the railroad employee is to be given every doubt before the 
court. Ratigan v. New York Central Railroad Company, 291 F.2d 548 (2nd Cir. 
1961), citing, inter alia, Harris v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 361 U.S. 15 (1959), 
Moore v. Terminal Railroad Association, 358 U.S. 31 (1958). And, importantly, 
the right to a jury trial on the questions of whether the Defendant's negligence 
caused Plaintiffs injury is viewed as an integral part of the remedy Congress 
fashioned for railroad workers. Bailey v. Central Virginia Railroad Co., 319 U.S. 
350 (1943). In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500 
(1957), the Supreme Court found that underpinning the FELA was a clear 
congressional intent that railroad related injury cases should be submitted to juries 
for resolution. As the Court there observed: 
"The Congress when adopting the law was particularly concerned that 
the issues whether there was employer fault and whether that fault 
played any part in the injury of death of the employee should be 
reached by the jury whenever fair minded men could reach these 
conclusions on the evidence . . . The inclusion in the 1908 statute of 
another provision, 'all questions of fact relating to negligence shall be 
brought before the jury to determine,' was proposed but not adopted. 
The view prevailed that this would be surplusage light of the seventh 
amendment embodying the common law tradition that fact questions 
were for the jury." 
Id. At 508-509, citing Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor 
on S. 5307,60m Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9,45-46. 
Hence, the inescapable and unassailable conclusion that, except in the rarest 
of instances, causes of action under the FELA must be submitted to a jury and 
"only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the 
conclusion" that the plaintiffs injury was caused by the railroad's negligence can 
the case be taken from the jury. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). 
POINT III. 
The trial court committed reversible error since the evidence required to 
establish liability in an FELA case is much less than an ordinary negligence 
action. 
The FELA provides that the railroad employer is liable whenever an 
employee's injury results "in whole or in part from negligence of any of the 
officers, agents or employees" of the railroad. 45 U.S.C. §51. Interpreting this 
provision in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., supra, the United States Supreme 
Court held that under the FELA, "the test of a jury case is simply whether the 
proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, 
even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." 
Accordingly, it has long been accepted doctrine that "the question of evidence 
required to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than an ordinary 
negligence action." Harbin v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company, 921 F.2d 
129 (7th Cir. 1990). Indeed, the Harbin court's analysis of the case law prompted it 
to observe that numerous FELA actions have been submitted to a jury based on 
"evidence scarcely more substantial than pigeon bone broth." Id. At 132. 
Certainly, the quantum of proof necessary to create a question of fact in FELA 
cases is very small; so small that, if as it has been said, it is "more than a scintilla of 
evidence", it is "not much more". Aparicio v. Norfolk and Western Railway, 84 
F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1996). 
The railroad has a non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work, and to 
provide safe tools and equipment. Rogers v. Missouri Railroad Co., supra and 
Moore v. Terminal R.R. of St. Louis, 358 U.S. 31 (1958). 
Although a FELA employer is not the insurer of the safety of its employees, 
it does owe them a continuing duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace, 
Kimbler v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R., 331 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1964); a duty 
which is non-delegable. Shenker v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 374 U.S. 
1(1963). This duty includes the obligation to provide employees with the 
equipment, training and assistance necessary to complete the task assigned, Blair v. 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 323 U.S. 600 (1945), to inspect the place where the 
railroad's employees work and the responsibility to take reasonable precautions to 
protect its employees from possible dangers. Kozad v. Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway, 622 F.2d 72,75 (4th Cir. 1980). 
The defendant also has a non-delegable duty to warn its workers of any 
hazards in the work, even if the danger cannot be avoided. Hose v. Chicago 
Northwestern Trans. Co., 70 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1995). In addition, the employer is 
charged with a duty to reasonably foresee potential harm and take appropriate 
prophylactic measures. Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 372 
U.S. 108 (1963). The plaintiff, in Gallick, was the beneficiary of the relaxed 
standard for the submission of FELA cases injuries. Mr. Gallick worked around a 
stagnant pool of water, which contained dead and decayed rats and insects. While 
working near the pool, plaintiff was bitten by an insect, which through bizarre 
complications led to both legs being amputated. The plaintiff had no evidence that 
the insect, which bit him, had any connection with the stagnant pool, or that the 
railroad should have foreseen such an injury would have resulted form the stagnant 
pool. As a result of these perceived deficiencies, the Ohio Court of Appeals 
reversed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reinstated the 
verdict, holding that the questions of whether the railroad should have foreseen an 
injury such as the plaintiffs and taken steps to protect against it were necessarily 
ones for the jury. Gallick, 83 S.Ct. at 667. Merely because there had never been a 
similar incident in the past did not mean that the injury was not "foreseeable" 
under the FELA. Id. at 121. 
It has been suggested that actual or constructive notice is not required where 
the defendant had control of the premises so that its conduct could be considered a 
sole cause of the dangerous condition which caused injury to plaintiff. Webb v. 
Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U. S. 512 (1957). 
Examples of where liability has been imposed for maintaining an unsafe 
condition include 1) Where the railroad allowed poor footing conditions because 
of ice and snow, dirt and debris, slippery substances, or holes; Barrett v. Toledo, P. 
& W. R.R., 334 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1964); 2) Where the railroad allowed insufficient 
room to work in Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649 (1947); or inadequate 
lighting; Murray v. Denver & R.G. W. R.R., 229 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1956); or 3) 
switching operations performed at night without adequate lighting. Tiller v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 310 U.S. 54 (1943); Also, a railroad will be held liable 
for train movement without sufficient warning Elliot v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 487 
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1972); or obstruction of the work areas. Brewer v. Norfolk & W. 
RY., 128 111. Ap.2d 200,261 N.E.2d 541 (1970). 
Clearly, case law reflects an unwavering judicial philosophy that virtually all 
FELA cases should be submitted to the jury. Where there is any part in causing or 
aggravating Plaintiffs condition, then the case must be given to the jury to resolve. 
A right to trial by jury on the question of whether a railroad company's negligence 
caused Plaintiffs injury is an integral part of the remedy Congress afforded 
railroad workers under the FELA, and as such may not easily be denied. Bailey v. 
Central Virginia Railroad Co., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Rogers v. Missouri Pacific. 
Supra. 
Plaintiffs expert Charles Culver, a railroad operations consultant has 
indicated through Affidavit (Plaintiffs Exhibit "1", Affidavit of Charles Culver) 
that the crew of Utah train RUT311 should have been, but was not informed of the 
malfunctioning signals at the grade crossing at 17th North Street, prior to reaching 
the location of the malfunction. These facts are established through the deposition 
testimony of Conductor Steve Clifton and gives rise to the violation of 49 C.F.R. 
Section 234.107 (a). Further, the failure of the dispatcher to notify the train crew 
violates Train Dispatcher Bulletin No. 80 issued December 1, 1999 which further 
requires the train dispatcher to notify the train crew of the malfunction of a 
crossing device. This violates Rule 6.32.2 of the General Code of Operating Rules 
for the Union Pacific Railroad Company. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit "2", Train 
Dispatcher's Bulletin No. 80) These two violations of both Federal law and the 
Railroad's Operating Rules clearly establish a fact question which must be decided 
by the trier of fact. In addition to these rules, the facts serve to establish, at the 
very least, a question of fact which should be determined by the trier of fact, under 
both Utah law and The Federal Employer's Liability Act. 
POINT IV. 
The trial court committed reversible error since the Defendant had a duty to 
instruct it's employee's in safe working practice and warn of unsafe 
conditions. 
A railroad has a duty to instruct its employees on safe working practices. If 
the employee is inexperienced, the railroad has a duty to instruct him and to 
provide him with the knowledge and experience he needs to do the work safely. 
Whether the employee is experienced or not, the railroad has a duty to warn him of 
dangers about which it knew or should have know. Liability will exist 1) where 
the plaintiff is not warned of dangers known or observed by his co-workers; 
Pittman v. Gulf, C & S. F. Ry., 338 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); 2) where 
plaintiffs co-workers fail to warn him of a change in their work activity; Johnson 
v. Missouri K. T. Ry., 334 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1960); 3) where the plaintiff is not 
warned of the movement of cars or trains; Dunn v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 285 
S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1956); 4) where the railroad fails to warn third persons of 
plaintiffs dangerous position; Ft. Worth & Denver Ry., v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 
307 (5th Cir. 1956); or 5) where plaintiff is not warned of dangers at or near the 
area where he is working. Kansas, O. & G. Ry. v. Woodward, 198 F.2d 322 (10th 
Cir. 1952). 
In Chambers v. Lofton, 67 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1953); the railroad was liable 
where it failed to instruct the plaintiff on the proper use and location of a guard on 
a power saw, when it knew that the plaintiff was inexperienced in the use of that 
tool. 
In Kiger v. Terminal R.R., 311 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1958); the railroad was liable 
for injuries suffered by plaintiff when the car door he was trying to close fell on 
him. The railroad knew that the top hanger of the door was loose and failed to 
warn plaintiff. In Trowbridge v. Chicago andl.M.R. Co., 263 N.E.2d 619 (111. Ct. 
App. 1970); recovery was allowed to a brush cutter who was a seasonal employee 
of twenty years when he was injured by a chain saw which tended to jump and did 
not have a safety guard and was operated by a fellow employee while the plaintiff 
was holding branches. He was not instructed in the use of the saw, no safety 
meetings had been held for several years and the use of the saw was not included 
in safety rules, thereby justifying a finding of negligence against the railroad. In 
Marmo v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 350 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1965); the railroad was 
held liable where the plaintiff caught his hand between a wheel unit and the diesel 
unit on to which he was lowering it, where the railroad assigned plaintiff operate a 
machine to accomplish that task, and knowing of his lack of experience, did not 
instruct him on the dangers involved. 
CONCLUSION 
WHERFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Appellant Clayson, respectfully 
prays that this Court of Appeals will reverse the final judgment that the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah granted, and remand this 
case to the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah for 
further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. Appellant Clayson also 
requests such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which he may show 
himself entitled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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SHAYNE M. CLAYSON MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 020905849 
V. Judge Fratto 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY 
The matter is before the court to consider defendants* Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff makes common law and Federal Employers' Liability Act negligence claims 
against defendants, arising from a train striking him while working on a malfunctioning railroad 
crossing signal. Defendants assert plaintiffbacked into the oncoming train, and that none of the 
facts cited by plaintiff, even if true, are material to the issue of negligence. 
The court grants summary judgment where there are no material facts reasonably in 
dispute, and therefrom the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendants are obligated to provide a reasonably safe work environment and operate the 
train in a reasonably safe manner. Having considered the pleadings and arguments, the court is 
persuaded that the facts relied upon by plaintiff to show negligence are not material to a breach of 
these duties, with the exception of the fact regarding the sounding of a horn from the train prior 
to the accident. 
As to this fact, the court is persuaded that it is material but not reasonably iii dispute. 
Defendants present evidence that a horn was sounded. Plaintiff counters with testimony from 
witnesses that do not recall hearing a horn. Testimony about not hearing a hom, when the witness 
l 
03.2004 15:50 801 278 8603 Page 
is not focused on trying to hear a horn, is insufBcient to characterize this fact as reasonably in 
dispute. 
Accordingly, the motion is granted. Counsel for defendants should submit a proposed 
order consistent with this minute entry. 
Dated this 26^da^ef July, 2004 
BY: 
UG 03,2004 15:50 801 278 8603 Page 2 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULKS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 178 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
A.L.R.3d 1070. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- Failure to give notice of application for de-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d fault judgment where notice is required only by 
1272. custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. Default judgments against the United States 
Opening default or default judgment claimed under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
to have been obtained because of attorney's Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 





— Extension of time to submit. 
— Failure to submit. 
— Inconsistency with deposition. 
— Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
— Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
— Superseding pleadings. 
— Unpleaded defenses. 
— Verified pleading. 
— Waiver of right to contest. 
— When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
— Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
— Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 






— Admissions of plaintiff. 
— Facts considered. 
— Improper evidence. 
— Proof. 
— Unsupported motion. 
— Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
— Contract interpretation. 
— Corporate existence. 
— Deeds. 




Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
— Provision not jurisdictional. 
— Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
— Damage to insured vehicle. 
— Dispersal of interest. 
— Findings by court. 
— Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
— Fraud or duress. 
— Guardianship. 
— Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
— Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
— Note. 
— Product liability action. 
— Recovery for goods and services. 
— Stock ownership. 
— Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
— Breach of fiduciary duty. 
— Contract action. 
Waiver of claims. 
— Contract terms. 
— Deceit. 
— Defamation. 
— Duty of care. 
— Employee status. 




— Lease action. 
— Misrepresentation. 
— Negligence. 
— Proximate cause. 
— Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 




Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor 
Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 
1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
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Affidavits submitted by plaintiff that con-
tained opinion, legal conclusions, and facts not 
supported by adequate foundation but portions 
of which complied with Subdivision (e), because 
the objectionable statements did nothing more 
than supplement the arguments made in plain-
tiffs memorandum, did not prejudice defen-
dants. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
In case arising under county development 
code, affidavits from building inspector and 
from Deputy Attorney General stated conclu-
sions and opinions regarding county's accessory 
use argument, not specific facts supporting it. 
leaving no genuine issue for trial. Harper v. 
Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 
199S>. cert, granted, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999). 
A trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
striking affidavits in which many of the facts 
asserted were not based on personal knowl-
edge, lacked foundation, were conclusory, and 
contained hearsav. Murdock v. Springville 
Mini Corp., 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65. 
— Corporation. 
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a 
corporation, it is generally considered to be the 
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the 
personal knowledge of an agent of the corpora-
tion who is not a corporate officer regarding the 
facts to which he has sworn will generally not 
be presumed, and therefore, the specific "means 
and sources" of his information should be 
shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 
737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). 
— Experts . 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows the expert 
to state his opinion concerning the ultimate 
issue in the case, and an expert affidavit must 
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the 
opinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit is suffi-
cient if it articulates the facts upon which the 
opinion was based and if the facts were of the 
"tvpe usually relied upon by experts in the 
field ~ Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. 
App 1990). 
Because the sole purpose underlying Utah R. 
Evid 705 is to obviate the need to use hypo-
thetical questions to elicit expert opinion, the 
rule's drafters did not intend to exempt expert 
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment 
from the requirement in Subdivision (e) of this 
rule that affidavits set forth specific facts show-
ing there is a genuine issue for trial; affidavits 
must include not only the expert's opinion, but 
also the specific facts that logically support the 
export's conclusion. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 
P.ii 97 (Utah 1992). 
— Extension of time to submit. 
Motion for an extension of time under Subdi-
vision (0 was without merit because the mov-
ant tailed to explain why it was unable to 
submit evidentiary affidavits, or how a contin-
uance would have aided it to respond to a 
summary judgment motion. Campbell. Maack 
& Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397, 38 P.3d 
9S4 
— Eailure to submit. 
On its motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party failed to meet its burden of prov-
ing that there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact in averring that the area where 
plaintiff was injured was not a limited area or 
was not constantly intruded upon by trespass-
ers, as the defendant did not support the argu-
ment with an affidavit or any other evidence. 
Connor v. Union Pac. R.R., 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1998). 
— Inconsistency with deposition. 
Party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit 
that contradicts his deposition to create an 
issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment 
unless there is some substantial likelihood that 
the deposition testimony was in error or the 
party-deponent is able to state in his affidavit 
an adequate explanation for the contradictory 
answer in his deposition. Webster v. Sill, 675 
P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 
1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
— Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Where a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is based solely on his pleadings and ^ 
not made and supported by affidavits, as pro-
vided in Subdivision (c), plaintiff, pursuant to 
Subdivision (e), may rest on the allegations in 
his pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
Fact that party opposed to the motion for 
summary judgment fails to submit documents 
in opposition does not preclude the denial of the 
motion: where the party opposed submits no 
documents in opposition, the moving party may 
be granted summary judgment only if appropri-
ate, that is, he is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Olwell v. .Clark, 658 P2d 585 
(Utah 1982). 
When a party opposes a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment and fails to file 
any responsive affidavits or other evidentian 
materials allowed by Subdivision (e), the trial 
court may properly conclude that there are nc 
genuine issues of fact unless the face of the 
movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses tht 
existence of such an issue. Franklin Fin. v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 R2d 1040 (Utah 1983) 
Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transf. Co., 695 P.2d 
109 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987). 
Summary judgment need not be affirmed 
merely because party opposing summary judg 
ment did not file affidavits in order to avoic 
judgment against him. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered 
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
When read in light of Subdivision (b>, it i.-
clear that the Subdivision (e) requirement thai 
a party opposing the summary judgment mo 
tion file counter-affidavits applies only whei 
the moving party has elected to and has filer, 
affidavits in support of the motion. If the mov-
ing party chooses not to or simply fails to file 
affidavits. Subdivision <e) is inapplicable. Gadc 
v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment i.-
filed and supported by an affidavit, the part\ 
opposing the motion has an affirmative dutv U 
respond with affidavits or other materials al 
lowed by Subdivision (c>. D & L Supply \ 
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Saunni 77) P2d 420 (Utah 1989; Thayni v 
Beneficial Utah Inc 874 P2d 120 (Utah 1994) 
Resting on pleadings 
When adequate proof is submitted in suppoit 
of a motion for summarv judgment the plead 
ings are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact 
Dupler v Yates 10 Utah 2d 251 351 P2d 624 
(1960) 
An unverified amendment of a pleading 
bhould not be allowed to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment if the amendment does not 
effect any substantial change in the issues i s 
thev were originally formulated in the plead 
ings Dupler v Yates 10 Utah 2d 251 351 P2d 
624(1960) 
In view of 1965 amendment to this rule it 
was proper to grant summary judgment for 
plaintiff upon facts given by defendant in his 
deposition defendint could not rely upon alle 
^ations in pleading to create issue of f ict 
United Am Life Ins Co \ Willev 21 Utah 2d 
279 444 P2d 755 (1968) 
A party m ly not rely upon allegations in the 
pleadings to counter affidavits made upon per 
sonal know ledge stating facts contrary to those 
alleged in the pleadings Freed Fin Co v 
Stoker Motor Co 537 P2d 1039 (Utah 1975) 
A defendant cannot reh upon the mere alle 
gations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a 
summary judgment but must set forth specific 
facts showing that theie is a genuine issue for 
trial Thornock v Cook 604 P2d 934 (Utah 
1979) 
Allegations or denials in the pleadings are 
not a sufficient basis for opposing summary 
judgment Hall v Fitzgerald 671 P2d 224 
(Utah 1983) 
—Objection 
Because the defendants objection to the 
plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a sepa 
rate written motion to strike the plaintiff 
should have been given ten days to respond as 
prescribed bv Utah Code Jud Admin 
4 501(l)(b) Gillmor v Cummmgs 806 P2d 
1205 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
— Sufficiency 
In order for in affidavit to be of effective use 
in the determination of a motion for summarv 
judgment it must set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence Preston v Lamb 20 
Utah 2d 260 436 P2d 1021 (1968) Norton v 
Blackham 669 P2d 857 (Utah 1983) 
An lftidavit in opposition to motion for sum 
mnv judgment to be effective must set forth 
such facts is are admissible in evidence thus 
affidavit consisting of in ldmissible parol ev i 
dence used foi purpose of varying terms of 
wnt t tn agreement was ineffective Rainford v 
Rutin., 22 Utah 2d 252 151 P2d "69 1969) 
An affidavit that does not meet the require 
merits of this rule is subject to motion to strike 
Hovvick v Bank of Salt Like 28 Utah 2d 64 
498 P2d 352 (1972) 
In consideration of a motion foi summarv 
judgment answers to interrogatories mcorpo 
r \U d bv reference into an affidavit in support of 
the motion are subject to the rules of evidence 
Humphries v Remco Inc 30 Utah 2d 34b 517 
P2d U09 (1944) 
Affidavits in support of or opposition to a 
motion foi summary judgment are admissible 
unless they are not made on personal knowl 
edge their contents would not be admissible in 
evidence or the affiant was not competent to 
testify Strange v Ostlund 594 P2d 877 (Utah 
1979) Treloggan v lYeloggan 699 P2d 747 
(Utah 1985) 
Employee claiming he was fired in retaliation 
for whistle blowing failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to his wiongful termi 
nation because he did not produce evidence of 
actual safety violations but relied only on his 
own unsupported conclusions Winter v North 
west Pipeline Corp 820 P2d 916 (Utah 1991) 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony 
that would not b<. admissible if testified to at 
the trial may not properly be set forth in an 
affidivit supporting a summary judgment 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co v Blomquist 
29 Utah 2d ^8 ^04 P2d 1019 (1972) Walker v 
Rocky Mt Recreation Corp 29 Utah 2d 274 
508 P2d 538(1973) 
An affidavit that merely reflects the affida 
vits unsubstantiated conclusions and that fails 
to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to ere 
ate an issue of fact Walker v Rockv Mt Recre 
ation Corp 29 Utah 2d 274 508 P2d 538 
(1973) Williams v Melb\ 699 P2d 723 (Utah 
1985) 
Statements in an affidavit that are largely 
conclusorv in form and would not be admissi 
ble in evidence mav not be considered on 
motion for summarv judgment under Subdivi 
sion (e) Norton v Blackham 669 P2d 857 
(Utih 1983) 
A supporting affidavit must be based on the 
affiants personal knowledge and an affidavit 
based merely on his unsubstantiated opinions 
and beliefs is insufficient Treloggan v 
Treloggan 699 P2d 747 (Utah 1985) 
—Superseding pleadings 
As against general allegations of negligence 
contained in the complaint facts set out in 
affidavits cannot be construed as totally super 
seding the pleadings Lundberg v Backman 9 
Utah 2d 58 337 P2d 433 (1959) 
— Unpleaded defenses 
Defenbes not raised bv the answer or by 
proper motion mav not be raised in an affidavit 
in opposition to a motion for summary judg 
ment Vallev Bank & Tiust Co v Wilken 668 
P2d 493 (Utah 1983) 
—Verified pleading 
\ plaintiffs verified pleading that meets the 
requirements foi affidav its can be considered 
the equivalent of m affidavit for the purpose of 
defeating a motion lor summaiv judgment 
Pentecost v Haiward 699 P2d 696 (Utah 
198T) 
— Waiver of right to contest 
Formal or evidentiary defects in an affidavit 
in upport of or opposition to a motion for 
summarv judgment ire waived in the absence 
f i motion to strike or other objection Fox v 
Allstate Ins Co 22 Utah 2d 383 4^3 P2d 701 
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(1969); Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 
64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972); Strange v. Ostlund, 594 
P.2d 877 (Utah 1979); Franklin Fin. v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983); 
Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. All red, 685 P.2d 544 
(Utah 1984); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Where verified pleadings did not satisfy the 
criteria of Subdivision (e), but neither party 
objected to the form or the content of the other's 
verified pleading and/or affidavit and the trial 
court apparently raised no objections sua 
sponte, any evidentiary objections were deemed 
to be waived and the verified complaint was 
held sufficient to controvert the affidavit for 
purposes of avoiding summary judgment. Pen-
tecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant waived evidentiary errors in 
plaintiff's affidavit and in the recitation of 
supposedly uncontested facts in plaintiff's 
memorandum of points when he failed to object 
at the trial court. D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
—When unavailable. 
In libel action against student newspaper 
published at state university, where defense 
counsel presented affidavit asserting that 
newspaper was a university-controlled entity 
protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
and plaintiff's counsel in reply four days later 
stated that he was unable to respond to defen-
dant's contention due to lack of discovery, such 
a reply was sufficient under this rule to invoke 
the trial court's discretion, and it was an abuse 
of that discretion to enter summary judgment 
for defendant without granting plaintiff addi-
tional time for discovery. Strand v. Associated 
Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1977). 
Where investors sued attorney and his client 
with regard to funds lost in investment ven-
ture, the trial court erred in granting motion for 
summary judgment against them without al-
lowing them additional time to gather facts 
necessary to refute allegations in defendant's 
affidavit. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 
1984). 
Where the party opposing summary judg-
ment had initiated discovery prior to the filing 
of the summary judgment motion and received 
no response, the trial court should, under Sub-
division (f) of this rule, postpone its decision 
pending the completion of such discovery. Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(0 motion for continuance 
was properly denied because they did not file 
accompanying affidavits specifying the facts 
they believed further discovery would produce 
to defeat defendant's motion. Callioux v. Pro-
gressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying plaintiff's request for a continuance 
under Subdivision (f), where counsel's affidavit 
asserted merely that she had not had adequate 
time to conduct sufficient discovery and secure 
expert affidavits opposing those of respondents, 
and did not describe the type of additional 
discovery needed or the time necessary to com-
plete it. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
To determine whether an affidavit is suffi-
cient to merit a Subdivision (f) continuance, 
several factors should be considered: (1) the 
reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit 
must be "adequate" and the party against 
whom summary judgment is sought should not 
be merely on a "fishing expedition" for purely 
speculative facts; (2) there must have been 
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit 
for the party against whom the summary judg-
ment is sought to use discovery procedures, and 
thereby cross-examine the moving party; and 
(3) if discovery procedures were timely initi-
ated, the nonmoving party must have been 
afforded an appropriate response. Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). rev'd on other grounds, 827 P.2d 212 
(Utah 1992); Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 
P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Subdivision (f) motions should be granted 
liberally to provide adequate opportunity for 
discovery, because information gained during 
discovery may create genuine issues of fact 
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment. However, courts should not grant such 
motions when the party is dilatory or the argu-
ments are lacking in merit. Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). rev'd on other grounds, 827 P.2d 212 
(Utah 1992). 
When a party timely presents an affidavit 
under Subdivision (f) stating reasons why it is 
unable to proffer an evidentiary affidavit in 
opposition to its opponent's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court's discretion is 
invoked. Unless the court finds the affidavit 
dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should 
be treated liberally. United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 
1993): Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 ' 
(Utah 1994). 
A motion for additional time for discovery is 
properly denied as to claims barred by statutes 
of limitations. United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co, 870 P2d 880 (Utah 
1993). 
Exclusive control of facts. 
In a Subdivision if) motion, the mere aver-
ment of exclusive knowledge or control of the 
facts by the moving party is not adequate: the 
opposing party must show to the best of his 
ability what facts are within the movant's ex-
clusive knowledge or control; what steps have 
been taken to obtain the desired information 
pursuant to discovery procedures under tht 
rules: and that he is desirous of taking advan 
tage of these discovery procedures. Sandy Cit\ 
v. Salt Lake County,'794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990). rev'd on other grounds, 827 P.2c 
212 'Utah 1992). 
— Who may make. 
Any witness, not just a party, who has knowl 
edge of the facts can make an affidavit as t« 
material facts. Western Pac. Transp. Co. \ 
Beehive State Agnc. Coop., 597 P.2d 854 (Utal 
1979). 
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Affirmative defense. 
Summary judgment may be based on an 
affirmative defense, such as a valid release, 
that would defeat the cause of action. Ulibarri 
v. Chnstenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 
(1954). 
Answers to interrogatories. 
This rule must be considered together with 
Rule 56(e); thus, answers to interrogatories 
based on self-serving hearsay and conclusions 
are not sufficient to show genuine issue of 
material fact necessary to prevent summary 
judgment. A & M Enters., Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 
Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 700 (1971). 
While Subdivision (c) allows consideration of 
answers to interrogatories on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, evidence considered must be 
observations made on personal knowledge or it 
will be declared incompetent and of no weight. 
A & M Enters., Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 
363, 482 P.2d 700(1971). 
Appeal. 
Where the only controversy brought by the 
parties was the interpretation of a writing and 
both parties placed the question in the hands of 
the court by making mutual motions for sum-
mary judgment, the losing party was not enti-
tled to a trial on the facts after the court made 
its decision. Mastic Tile Div. of Ruberoid Co. v. 
Acme Distnb Co., 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 
(1964). 
On review of a grant of summary judgment to 
a plaintiff, the inquiry is whether there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if 
there is not, whether the plaintiffs are entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Thornock v. 
Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979) 
Where a party pursues a motion for summary 
judgment on one claim, he may not, on appeal, 
either justify the grant of such motion or chal-
lenge its denial on the basis of a separate and 
distinct claim. L & A Drvwall, Inc. v. Whitmore 
Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980). 
A challenge to a summary judgment presents 
for review only conclusions of law because, by 
definition, cases decided on summary judgment 
do not resolve factual disputes. Schurtz v. BMW 
of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
In appeal from summary judgment, court 
refused to consider arguments that were not 
raised before the trial court. Olson v Park-
Craig-OLson, Inc , 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Although an appellate court reviews the en-
try of summary judgment for correctness, ac-
cording no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions, review of a municipality's land use 
decision is limited to determining whether the 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Ralph L Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. West Jor-
dan City. 2000 UT App 49, 999 P.2d 1240 
— Adversely affected party. 
Recognizing that the party adverse 1\ affected 
by the summary judgment has not had an 
opportunity for trial, the court views the facts 
m the light most favorable to that party When 
summary judgment is granted, the party ad-
versely affected is the partv who did not move 
for summary judgment. If summary judgment 
is denied on the merits and a claim or defense of 
the movant thereby eliminated, then the facts 
are viewed in the light most favorable to the 
moving party. Estate Landscape & Snow Re-
moval Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
— Standard of review. 
On review of a summary judgment or a 
motion on the pleadings treated as a motion for 
summary judgment under Rule 12(c), the party 
against whom the judgment has been granted 
is entitled to have all the facts presented, and 
all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, con-
sidered m a light most favorable to him. Morris 
v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 
297 (1953), Young v Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 
331 P2d 1099 (1958), Brandt v. Spnngville 
Banking Co , 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P2d 460 
(1960), Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 
P.2d 909 (1960); Aliens Prods. Co. v. Glover. 18 
Utah 2d 9, 414 P.2d 93 (1966); Pioneer Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Pioneer Fin. & Thrift Co., 18 Utah 
2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 (1966); Geneva Pipe Co. v. 
S & H Ins. Co, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); 
Thompson v Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 
395 P.2d 62 < 1964); Whitman v WT. Grant Co., 
16 Utah 2d 81. 395 P2d 918 (1964); English v. 
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel Co v. Garfield County, 811 
P2d 184 (Utah 1991); Winegar v Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
Upon review of a grant of a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the Supreme Court applies the 
same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 
(Utah 1977), Bnggs v Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, the appellate court must review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and affirms only where it appears 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
issues of fact, or where, even according to the 
facts as contended by the losing party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 
595 P2d 526 (Utah 1979); Bnggs v. Holcomb, 
740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), Copper 
State Leasing Co v Blacker Appliance & Furn 
Co . 770 P2d 88 (Utah 1988), Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical. Inc, 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct 
App. 1988', Hunt v ESI Eng*g, Inc., 808 P2d 
1137 (Utah Ct. App ). cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1991). 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate 
court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Barber \ Farmers Ins Exch., 751 
P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Winegar v 
Froerer Corp., 813 P2d 104 (Utah 1991 > 
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judg-
ment presents for review conclusions of law 
only, because, by definition, summary judg-
ments do not resolve factual issues, the appel-
late court reviews those conclusions for correct-
ness, without according deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions Bonham v Morgan, 
788 P2d 197 (Utah 1989); Daniels v Deseret 
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Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989); 
Transamenca Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie 
Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (1990); Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 
811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). 
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court 
makes findings of fact from extrinsic evidence, 
the appellate court's review is strictly limited. 
However, if the contract is ambiguous but the 
case is decided on summary judgment, the 
appellate court can affirm only if the undis-
puted material facts concerning the parties' 
intent demonstrate that the successful liti-
gant's position is correct as a matter of law. 
Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/ 
Salt Lake County Mental Health, 776 P.2d 941 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989). 
In considering an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court views 
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing 
party below. And in determining whether those 
facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of 
judgment for the prevailing party below, the 
appellate court gives no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed 
for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
An appellate court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions given to support 
the grant of summary judgment, but reviews 
them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. 
Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. 
In determining whether the trial court cor-
rectly found that there were no genuine issues 
of material fact, the appellate court views the 
facts and all reasonable inferences in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion. It reviews the trial court's conclusions of 
law for correctness, including its conclusion 
that there are no material fact issues. 
Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell. 
824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Reviewing court may affirm a grant of sum-
mary judgment on any ground available to the 
trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1993). 
Applicability. 
When affidavits or other evidence is pre-
sented in conjunction with a motion to dismiss 
under U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and the court does not 
exclude them, the motion is generally treated 
as a motion for summarv judgment pursuant to 
this rule. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co.. 926 
P.2d 835 (Utah 1996). 
Evidentiary hearing to adduce facts for the 
purpose of ruling on a summary judgment 
motion is not a trial and does not require an 
order specifying facts under Subdivision <d). 
Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County 
Att'y, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899. 
Attorney's fees. 
WThere attorney's fees are awarded to a pre-
vailing party on summary judgment, the undis-
puted, material facts must establish, as a mat-
ter of law, that (1) the party is entitled to the 
award and (2) the amount awarded is reason-
able. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Availability of motion. 
The remedy of summary judgment is avail-
able to both the plaintiff and the defendant, on 
the original action or counterclaims. National 
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 
16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965). 
Summary judgment on a complaint is not 
precluded by the existence of a counterclaim. 
Bennion v. Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 
(1972); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 
1993). 
Compliance with rule. 
Summary judgment procedure is a drastic 
remedy, requiring strict compliance with the 
rule authorizing it. Summary judgments may-
be granted without strict compliance with the 
rules only when both parties are present and no 
prejudice is shown. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178 (Utah 1993). 
Cross-motions. 
When both parties move for summary judg-
ment, the court is not bound to grant it to one 
side or another. Diamond T. Utah, Inc. v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 
(1968). 
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not 
warrant the court's granting of summary judg-
ment unless one of the moving parties is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts 
that are not genuinely disputed. Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1981). 
Cross-motions may be viewed as involving a 
contention by each movant that no genuine 
issue of fact exists under the theory it ad-
vances, but not as a concession that no dispute 
remains under the theory advanced by its ad-
versary. In effect, each cross-movant implicitly 
contends that it is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. but that if the court determines 
otherwise, factual disputes exist that preclude 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
other side. Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 
821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1990). 
Damages. 
Defendant's failure to oppose plaintiff's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment in an action 
for legal malpractice was a capitulation only on 
the question of whether there was a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to his breach 
of duty, and granting judgment did not relieve 
plaintiff of the obligation to prove any damages 
he sustained that were proximately caused by 
defendants negligence. W'illiams v. Barber, 765 
P.2d 887 (Utah 1988). 
Discovery. 
Generally, summarv judgment should not be 
granted if discovery is incomplete, since infor-
mation sought in discovery may create genuine 
issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the 
motion. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 
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740 R2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277(1987). 
District court properly denied plaintiff's mo-
tions to compel further deposing of defendant 
and to continue the summary judgment hear-
ing, where plaintiff's counsel was simply on a 
"fishing expedition" for purely speculative facts 
after substantial discovery had been conducted 
without producing any significant evidence. 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 
(1987). 
Because the facts the plaintiff sought to dis-
cover would not be legally relevant to the reso-
lution of the issues, the denial of the plaintiff's 
motion to continue discovery was proper. Amer-
ican Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech. Inc., 
930 P2d 1182 (Utah 1996). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying plaintiff's motion for further discovery, 
since the trial court had ruled that the defen-
dant was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law on the plaintiff's claim of defa-
mation, and therefore further discovery was 
unnecessary. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 
(Utah 1999). 
Where plaintiff's claims failed as a matter of 
law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a motion under this rule after deter-
mining that additional discovery would not 
have addressed the legal issues presented in 
the summary judgment proceeding. Holmes v. 
American States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 85, 1 
P.3d 552. 
Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion was properly 
denied where, after the initial requests for 
discovery and one letter of reminder, plaintiffs 
counsel waited until the very last day of discov-
ery to act. Plaintiffs counsel had a duty to act 
with reasonable diligence. Brown v. Glover, 
2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540. 
Disputed facts. 
Where disputed facts would not establish a 
basis upon which plaintiff could recover, no 
matter how they were resolved, it would have 
been useless to try them and a dismissal on a 
summary judgment was proper. Abdulkadir v. 
Western Pac. R.R., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 
(1957). 
On a motion for summary judgment against a 
defendant, where some of the facts are in dis-
pute, a judgment can properly be rendered 
against him only if, on the undisputed facts, the 
defendant has no valid defense. Disabled Am. 
Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 
P.2d 416(1959). 
Summary judgment cannot properly be 
granted if the allegations of the plaintiffs com-
plaint stand m opposition to the averments of 
the affidavits >o that there are controverted 
issues of fact, the determination of which is 
necessary to settle the rights of the parties. 
Christensen ex rel. Christcnsen v. Financial 
Serv.Co., 14 Utah 2d 101,377P.2d 1010(1963). 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute 
averments on other side of controversy and 
create issue of fact, precluding summary judg-
ment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975). 
The presence of a dispute as to material facts 
disallows the granting of a summary judgment. 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P2d 238 
(Utah 1977). 
Where the parties were not in complete con-
flict as to certain facts, but the understanding, 
intention, and consequences of those facts were 
vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper 
for summary judgment and could only be re-
solved by a trial. Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 
1291 (Utah 1978). 
Summary judgment is not precluded simply 
whenever some fact remains in dispute, but 
only when a material fact is genuinely contro-
verted. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P2d 
1390 (Utah 1980). 
Evidence. 
In case of motion for summary judgment the 
adverse party is entitled to have the court 
survey the evidence and all reasonable infer-
ences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth 
Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 
395 P.2d 62 (1964); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 
P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
Where trial court granted defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on the ground that the 
plaintiffs own statement in his deposition 
showed that plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent in causing his injuries, on appeal by plain-
tiff, contesting that ruling, Supreme Court was 
obliged to consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff. Whitman v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964). 
Submissions in support of or opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment should be looked 
at in the light favorable to the nonmoving 
party's position. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Because disposition of a case by summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, 
including evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Beehive 
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
Defendant's admission that she had failed to 
cure numerous violations of her lease agree-
ment with the plaintiffs negated her contention 
that plaintiffs would not have taken the same 
action against her if not for her "multi-genera-
tional" family, and thus any dispute as to the 
plaintiffs' purported discriminatory intent in 
issuing a seven-day notice was immaterial and 
did not preclude summary judgment. Malibu 
Inv. Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30, 996 P2d 1043. 
— Facts considered. 
In ruling on a motion for a summary judg-
ment, the court may consider only facts that are 
not in dispute. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 
(Utah 1978). 
— Improper evidence. 
Where summary judgment is granted, there 
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has been no hearing and no evidence has been 
viewed by the court and, therefore, no appeal 
may be made on the basis of improper evidence. 
Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974). 
-—Proof. 
The quantum of proof to show nonexistence 
of a material fact is of necessity less than that 
required to prove a matter of affirmative de-
fense. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 
624(1960). 
— Unsupported motion. 
Trial court erred in granting the defendant's 
unsupported motion for summary judgment on 
a wrongful death claim brought by the plaintiff 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as 
the plaintiff, absent any evidence submitted in 
affidavits by the defendant to support its mo-
tion for summary judgment, needed only to 
make out a prima facie case in her pleadings, 
and the trial court based its ruling on a point 
that was in factual dispute given the lack of 
evidence presented by the defendant. 
Wilkinson v. Union Pac* R.R., 975 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1998). 
—Weight of testimony. 
Court cannot consider weight of testimony or 
credibility of witnesses on motion for summary 
judgment; court simply determines that there 
is no disputed issue of material fact and that as 
matter of law one party should prevail. Single-
ton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 
1978). 
Summary judgment is never used to deter-
mine what the facts are, but only to ascertain 
whether there are any material issues of fact in 
dispute. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 
25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
On a motion for summary judgment, it is not 
appropriate for a court to weigh disputed evi-
dence concerning such factors; the sole inquiry 
to be determined is whether there is a material 
issue of fact to be decided. W.M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1981); Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). 
Implicit rulings. 
If a motion for summary judgment on a 
claim, the notice of hearing on the motion, and 
the summary judgment itself make no refer-
ence to an existing counterclaim, the summary 
judgment is an implicit ruling on the counter-
claim only to the extent that the ruling on the 
claim necessarily rejects conflicting contentions 
in the counterclaim. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Summary judgment against husband suing 
for damages occasioned by alleged negligent 
injury to wife was sustained since wife rather 
than husband was proper party to sue for 
damages claimed. Corbndge v. M. Morrm & 
Son, 19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967). 
Issue of fact. 
A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the 
basis of the facts in the record, reasonable 
minds could differ on whether defendant's con-
duct measures up to the required standard. 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
In order for nonmoving party to oppose suc-
cessfully a motion for summary judgment and 
send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not neces-
sary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is 
only necessary for nonmoving party to show 
"facts" controverting the "facts" stated in mov-
ing party's affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
— Contract interpretation. 
When contract interpretation must be deter-
mined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it be-
comes a question of fact, and if this extrinsic 
evidence is disputed, then a material fact is also 
disputed and summary judgment cannot be 
granted. Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
— Corporate existence. 
Where an issue of fact was raised as to 
whether plaintiff veterans' organization was a 
corporation having a right to institute suit in 
its own name under Rule 17(d), or was in fact a 
voluntary unincorporated association, a sum-
mary judgment against the defendant nonprofit 
corporation was precluded on this point. Dis-
abled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 
152,340 P.2d 416 (1959). 
— Deeds. 
Presumptive validity of deeds created issues 
of fact which precluded summary judgment for 
plaintiffs attacking deeds. Judkins v. Toone, 27 
Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972). 
— Lease as security. 
Whether a lease was intended as security for 
a sale is a question to be determined on the 
facts of each case, as is the issue of whether the 
nature of the document raises questions of fact 
that preclude summary judgment. Colonial 
Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 
P2d 483 lUtah 1986). 
— Notice. 
The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment on the issue of notice, because the 
nonmoving party failed to allege specific facts 
to show that his insurer had failed to mail him 
the cancellation notice on his policy. Baumgart 
v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). 
— Wills. 
Material issues of fact were in dispute when 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether 
decedent intended to remove appellant as ben-
eficiary where decedent was in the process of 
changing the beneficiarv at the time of death. 
Estate of Anello v. McQueen. 921 P.2d 1030 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Judicial attitude. 
Because a summary judgment prevents liti-
gants from fully presenting their case to the 
court, courts are, and should be, reluctant to 
invoke this remedy. Brandt v. Springville Bank-
ing Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). 
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Motion for new trial. 
A motion for a "new" trial following summary 
judgment is procedurally correct and available 
to litigants. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 R2d 
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Filing of an "exception to order and motion 
for reconsideration" of summary judgment 
tolled the thirty-day time period within which 
to file a notice of appeal; notwithstanding the 
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, where 
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Motion to dismiss. 
Where, in an action based on an alleged 
contract, the parties have stipulated all of the 
evidence, and the defendant moves for dis-
missal of the action on the ground that, as a 
matter of law, the evidence shows no meeting of 
the minds, the motion is really a motion for a 
summary judgment, and can be granted only if 
there is no evidence from which it would be 
reasonable to find that there was a meeting of 
the minds. R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 
Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952). 
In denying defendant's motion to dismiss 
libel complaint for failure to state a claim, trial 
court acted improperly in demanding that 
plaintiff produce evidence to support her alle-
gation of malice and in entering a summary 
judgment for defendant on her failure to do so, 
since the court on its own initiative should not 
try to convert a motion for dismissal into one for 
summary judgment. Hill v. Grand Cent., Inc., 
25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
Motion to reconsider. 
Court properly refused to reconsider when 
the party seeking reconsideration did not 
present any legal theories that had not already 
been considered and, although it elaborated on 
some facts, it presented no material facts that 
had not been before the court at the time of the 
original decision to grant summary judgment. 
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, 
Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Notice. 
A summary judgment is proper even in the 
absence of any formal notice by the moving 
party when it appears there are no true factual 
issues and the court can resolve the remaining 
determination of questions of law. Security Ti-
tle Co. v. Payless Bldrs. Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 
407 P.2d 141 (1965). 
Where a party cannot prove that his rights 
were adversely affected, an appellate court will 
uphold a summary judgment granted at a hear-
ing held less than 10 days after service of the 
notice of, and motion for, a summary judgment. 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972). 
— Provision not jurisdictional. 
Trial court did not lack jurisdiction to render 
summary judgment where notice of the motion 
was mailed only nine days prior to the hearing 
but defendants were present at the hearing; 
notice provision of this rule is not jurisdictional. 
Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 
2d 274,508 P.2d 538(1973). 
Because a violation of the notice requirement 
of Subdivision (c) does not divest the court of 
jurisdiction over the motion, it has the power to 
grant summary judgment despite such a viola-
tion. However, such a violation will void the 
grant unless the violation amounts to harmless 
error. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991). 
— Waiver of defect. 
Where defendant failed to object in the trial 
court to the fact that a notice of a motion for 
summary judgment was mailed only nine days 
prior to the hearing, any defect was deemed to 
have been waived. Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recre-
ation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 
(1973). 
Procedural due process. 
Defendant was not denied procedural due 
process on ground that it did not have reason-
able opportunity to prepare for trial and engage 
in discovery procedures despite fact that only 
13 days lapsed between the mailing of defen-
dant's answer and the filing of plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Walker v. Rocky 
Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 
538(1973). 
Purpose. 
The primary purpose of the summary judg-
ment procedure is to pierce the allegations of 
the pleadings, to show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, although an issue may be 
raised by the pleadings, and to establish that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 
351 P.2d 624 (1960). 
The sole purpose of summary judgment is to 
bar from the courts unnecessary and unjusti-
fied litigation. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & 
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685 (1965). 
A motion for summary judgment provides a 
means for searching out the undisputed facts as 
shown by the pleadings, depositions, admis-
sions, answers to interrogatories and docu-
ments before the court; its aim is to discover 
whether a controversy can be settled as a 
matter of law, thereby saving both court and 
litigants the time, trouble and expense of a 
trial; but because the party against whom a 
summary judgment is entered is deprived of 
the privilege of a trial, the record must be 
carefully scrutinized to see if that party pre-
sents allegations which, if true, would entitle 
him to judgment; if so, then summary judgment 
is improper. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1976). 
In circumstances where the granting of a 
motion for summary dismissal is justified, it 
serves the salutary purpose of eliminating the 
time, trouble and expense of a trial that would 
be to no avail anyway. McBride v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 431 (Utah 19801 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties 
to pierce the pleadings to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue to present to the fact 
finder. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 
692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
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Scope. 
The moving party decides what issues to 
present to the court for adjudication. The party 
may move for summary judgment on all or less 
than all of the issues raised by the complaint 
and answer and may also move for determina-
tion of issues raised by any counterclaim or 
cross-claim if he or she deems it appropriate. 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). 
Summary judgment improper. 
If there is any genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact, the motion should be denied. Young v. 
Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862, cert, 
denied, 344 U.S. 886, 73 S. Ct. 186, 97 L. Ed. 
685 (1952); Ruffmengo v. Miller. 579 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1978). 
Unless there is a showing that the disfavored 
parties cannot produce evidence that would 
reasonably support a rinding in their favor on a 
material or determinative issue of fact, a sum-
mary judgment is erroneous. Bridge v. 
Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960); 
Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991); 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1991). 
Summary judgment was erroneously entered 
for plaintiff where issue of fact was raised by 
pleadings and counteraffidavit of defendant. 
Hatch v. Sugarhouse Fin. Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 
434 P.2d 758(1967). 
Bare contentions, unsupported by any speci-
fication of facts in support thereof, raise no 
material questions of fact to preclude the entry 
of summary judgment. Massev v. Utah Power & 
Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). 
A motion for summary judgment should be 
denied where the evidence presents a genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor 
of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to 
judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Dabnev, 
645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when 
no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. 
Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Because there were genuine and material 
fact issues concerning the adverse conse-
quences of forfeiture suffered by the plaintiff in 
relation to damages sustained by the defendant 
through plaintiffs repeated failure to pay rent, 
which facts were not explicitly explored by 
either party, summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff was reversed and remand-for a trial on 
the issue of substantial compliance ordered. 
Cache County v. Beus, 1999 UT App 134, 978 
P.2d 1043. 
Where the trial court erred in striking expert 
testimony which would have raised a material 
issue of fact, and also erred in denying the 
plaintiffs motion to substitute a new expert, 
the grant of summary judgment on the basis of 
failure to present expert testimony was errone-
ous. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it 
found that the only issues to be decided were 
"matters of law" to be based upon the legislative 
record, in a case arising out of a multi-year, 
multiparty transaction with many contingen-
cies, Mnce the fairness of each years exchange 
values was a disputed question of material fact 
not resolvable on summary judgment. Price 
Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, 995 P2d 
1237. 
— Damage to insured vehicle. 
Insurer was improperly granted summary 
judgment in suit for damage to insured's vehi-
cle where fact questid^ existed wrhether vehicle 
was stolen car when wrecked or buyer on con-
ditional sales contract had taken possession of 
vehicle repossessed by finance company. Dia-
mond T. Utah. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.. 21 
Utah 2d 124, 441 R2d 705 (1968). 
— Dispersal of interest. 
Summary judgment was improperly granted 
m dispute over dispersal of savings account 
interest where settlement agreement made no 
mention of the interest while affidavit of plain-
tiffs attorney claimed that the interest was 
included as part of the settlement agreement. L 
& A Dry wall. Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 
P.2d 626 (Utah 1980). 
— Findings by court. 
While findings of fact are unnecessary to 
support granting of summary judgment, the 
grant of summary judgment is precluded where 
trial judge saw fit to make and enter findings 
and conclusions, the content of which evidence 
material issues of fact. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Atkm, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984). 
— Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
In action by vendors of real estate to foreclose 
two trust deeds executed by purchasers, sum-
mary judgment was improper where affidavit 
in support of motion for summary judgment 
and supporting documents showed unsup-
ported conclusions and unresolved issues of 
fact, even though vendors did not present affi-
davits in opposition to motion for summary 
judgment. Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co., 676 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984). 
Summary judgment upholding a trustee's 
right to foreclosure under a deed of trust was 
improper where the debtor and trustee con-
tested the issue of whether an entity to which 
the debtor made an alleged reinstatement pay-
ment was acting as the trustee's agent, which it 
true may have cured the debtor's default, and 
thus a genuine issue of material fact existed 
Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210 (Utah Ct 
App. 1998/. 
— Fraud or duress. 
Where plaintiff alleged that he was forced t( 
>ettle an insurance claim on a business-inter 
ruption policy for a reduced amount by clain 
adjuster's representation that an amount dm 
the plaintiff on a fire insurance policy could no 
be paid until plaintiff agreed to the lower pay 
ment on the business-interruption policy, tria 
court was not justified in concluding at a pre 
trial hearing that, as a matter of law, there wa: 
no fraud or duress alleged, and so was no 
justified in granting summary judgment for th< 
insurer. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guai 
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Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 
685(1965). 
Because plaintiffs motion did not address 
defendants allegations in a counterclaim of 
fraud in the inducement, claiming that defen-
dant had entered a lease because of specific 
promises made by the plaintiff before the lease 
was signed, it was error for the trial court to 
grant summary judgment on plaintiff's con-
tract claim on the lease. TS 1 Partnership v. 
Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
—Guardianship. 
A summary judgment dismissing an action to 
collect a promissory note because of the incom-
petency of the maker was improper where evi-
dence that guardian had been appointed for 
defendant under the Uniform Veterans' Guard-
ianship Act raised substantial fact issue. Home 
Town Fin. Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 
P.2d 72 (1962). 
— Mortgage note. 
Summary judgment was not proper where 
answer to complaint on note, although admit-
ting execution of note, further alleged that 
plaintiff was without authority to sign mort-
gage and that the matter was being litigated in 
another action between plaintiff and defendant. 
Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 
1039 (Utah 1975). 
—Negligence. 
In action to recover for injuries suffered when 
struck by rocks from dynamite blast exploded 
by neighboring farmers in constructing irriga-
tion ditch, issues of assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence should have been sub-
mitted to jury where plaintiff helped in activi-
ties of blasting to same extent and retreated 
same distance defendants did in their trucks 
but failed to dismount from his horse; summary 
judgment for defendants was vacated. Robison 
v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876 (1964). 
Ordinarily the question of negligence and 
contributory negligence may not be settled on a 
motion for summary judgment. Preston v. 
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968). 
Whether defendant's nominal charge for am-
bulance service constituted gratuitous accom-
modation or a payment removing passenger 
from guest status was fact question precluding 
summary judgment in action for alleged negli-
gent transportation to hospital. Willden v. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., 25 Utah 2d 96, 476 
P.2d 687 (1970). 
Naked assertions of negligence, unsupported 
by any facts, fall far short of raising a material 
issue of fact on the issue of negligence. Massey 
v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 
1980). 
Summary judgment should be granted with 
great caution in negligence cases. Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
While courts should be extremely cautious in 
granting summary judgment for defendant on 
the basis that plaintiff has failed to secure 
expert testimony to support a medical negli-
gence action, summary judgment may be al-
lowed where the record indicates that plaintiff 
lias had every opportunity to establish his case 
and has failed to demonstrate that he could 
show negligent acts or omissions on the part of 
defendant by expert medical testimony and the 
issue is clearly one which cannot be determined 
by laymen alone. Robinson v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Summary judgment, granted on the ground 
that plaintiff failed to file the notice required in 
a medical malpractice action within the statu-
tory limitation period, was reversed where the 
facts were unclear and did not give rise to the 
conclusion that, as a matter of law, plaintiff 
should have known of her legal injuries at the 
time she suffered them. Brower v. Brown, 744 
P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
Trial court properly granted summary judg-
ment against a customer who sued a 
storcowner for injuries sustained in a "slip and 
fall" accident just inside the store entrance, 
because the customer failed to raise any mate-
rial issues of fact beyond a bare contention that 
the storeowner was somehow negligent. 
Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A trial court may not grant summary judg-
ment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on a 
negligence issue, including resolving the appli-
cable standard of care, unless it correctly con-
cludes that the jury could not reasonably find 
the defendant's conduct to be negligent. Wycalis 
v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). 
— Nonspecific denial of requests for ad-
mission. 
Defendant's nonspecific denials to requests 
for admission contrary to Rule 36(a) did not 
entitle plaintiff to a summary judgment. Pace v. 
Pace, 559 P.2d 964 (Utah 1977). 
—Note. 
Trial judge's action in granting plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on a note, while 
reserving for trial defendants' affirmative de-
fense of lack of consideration for the same 
instrument, was inappropriate where it was 
not clear how plaintiffs could be entitled to 
judgment on the note as a matter of law if 
factual issues sufficient to warrant trial existed 
as to whether there was consideration. 
Agathangehdes v. Shaw, 740 P.2d 259 (Utah 
1987). 
— Product liability action. 
In a products liability action against an au-
tomobile manufacturer, summary judgment for 
defendant was improper where, even though 
the particular car which was the subject of the 
action was missing, plaintiff should have been 
given the opportunity to present evidence to 
support his claims of a design defect. Drvsdale 
v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997). 
— Recovery for goods and services. 
In action to recover for goods and services 
provided on an open account to a partnership, 
the record revealed disputed issues of material 
fact regarding treatment of the owner of one of 
the partners. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v Design 
Assocs., 635 P2d 53 (Utah 1981). 
— Stock ownership. 
Summan judgment was not proper where 
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conflicting affidavits, although not raising issue 
of ownership of stock shares, did raise issue as 
to whether subsequent purchaser for value and 
without notice was a bona fide purchaser. 
Strand v. Prince-Covey & Co., 534 P.2d 892 
(Utah 1975). 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment was improperly granted 
for transport company in action against defen-
dant for wrongful possession of a trailer, where 
complaint alleged value of use and possession 
of $10 per day but defendant denied this and 
asserted a much lower value and also requested 
a setoff for storage and care against any charge 
for possession. Western Pac. Transp. Co. v. 
Beehive State Agric. Coop., 597 P.2d 854 (Utah 
1979). 
Summary judgment proper. 
It must appear to a certainty that the plain-
tiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support 
of its claim before a judgment on the pleading 
may be granted. Securities Credit Corp. v. 
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
A summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In re 
Williams" Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683 
(1960); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1978); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982); Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1984); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 
714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986): Billings ex rel. Bill-
ings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1991). 
Even though the facts developed under a 
discovery process were not consistent with the 
allegations in a counterclaim, such facts did not 
impel a finding that there was a fact issue to be 
presented to an arbiter. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Utah 2d 329. 353 
P.2d 168(1960). 
This rule permits an excursion beyond the 
pleading and if the facts discovered irrefutably 
disprove facts pleaded, summary judgment is 
appropriate on motion therefor. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham. 10 Utah 2d 
329, 353 P.2d 168 (1960); Aird Ins. Agency v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 612 P2d 341 (Utah 
1980); Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 
1984). 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admission and inferences which. 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
loser, show that "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law": such 
showing must preclude ail reasonable possibil-
ity that the loser could, if given a trial, produce 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a 
judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Desert Dodge 
Truck Ctr., Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 
(1960). 
A summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes, as a matter of law. the award-
ing of any relief to the losing party. Tanner v. 
Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop., 11 Utah 2d 353, 
359 P.2d 18(1961). 
To sustain a summary judgment, the plead-
ings, evidence, admissions and inferences 
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the losing 
party, must show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, and that the winning party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such 
showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all 
reasonable possibility that the losing party 
could win if given a trial. Frederick May & Co. 
v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962); 
Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980 
(1972). 
Only where it clearly appears that the party 
against whom the judgment would be granted 
cannot possibly establish a right to recover 
should summary judgment be granted, and any 
doubts should be resolved in favor of such party 
when summary judgment against him is being 
considered. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & 
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211,~398 
P.2d 685(1965). 
A summary judgment can be granted only 
when it is shown that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
under those facts. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 
Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v. 
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). 
Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it clearly appears that there are no issues 
of material fact in dispute, which if resolved in 
favor of the adverse party would entitle him to 
prevail. University Club v. Invesco Holding 
Corp., 29 Utah 2d*l, 504 P.2d 29 (1972). 
A summary judgment motion should be 
granted only when all the facts entitling the 
moving party to a judgment are clearly estab-
lished or admitted. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 
458 i Utah 1978). 
A summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes, as a matter of law, the award-
ing of any relief to the losing party. FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 
1332 i Utah 1979). 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
losing side, establishes that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 <Utah 
1979). 
The grant of a motion for summary judgment 
(or the affirmance thereof on appeal) is appro-
priate only where there exists no genuine is-
sues of fact relevant to the disposition of the 
claim underlying the motion. L & A Drywall, 
Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 
(Utah 1980). 
Where pleadings, answers to interrogatories 
and depositions disclosed undisputed facts 
which permitted resolution of controversy as a 
matter of law, it was appropriate to enter sum-
marv judgment. Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First 
Natl Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah'l980). 
Even if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, a summary judgment is proper 
only if the pleadings and other documents dem-
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anstrate that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as matter of law. Lockhart Co. v. 
Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). 
Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it clearly appears that there is no reason-
able probability that the party moved against 
could prevail. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1984). 
Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it is clear from the undisputed facts that 
the opposing party cannot prevail. Conder v. 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 
739 P.2d 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
When the moving party has presented evi-
dence sufficient to support a judgment in its 
favor, and the opposing party fails to submit 
contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in 
concluding that no genuine issue of fact is 
present or would be at trial. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
—Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Summary judgment was appropriately 
granted to the defendants on a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty where no fiduciary relation-
ship was created by a homeowner's payment to 
a title insurance company for a title search in 
connection with the preparation of a commit-
ment for title insurance and where the plaintiff 
presented no evidence of any breach of any duty 
that may have existed. Gildea v. Guardian Title 
Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998). 
—Contract action. 
Summary judgment was properly awarded 
car dealer suing bank for portion of reserve 
account being held by bank to secure condi-
tional sales contract sold to bank since acts and 
statements of dealer did not in fact terminate 
contract and consequently there was no genu-
ine issue of fact requiring trial. Spencer Auto 
Sales, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank, 20 Utah 2d 145, 
434 P.2d 455(1967). 
Summary judgment on a contract claim was 
proper where a fully integrated contract specif-
ically stated that certain payroll reports where 
to be prepared only "as needed," while the 
plaintiff claimed the contract contained an im-
plied provision that the defendant was strictly 
required to prepare the payroll reports. ELM, 
Inc. v. M.T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 
1999). 
Summary judgment for the defendant, the 
Department of Financial Institutions (DFI), 
was affirmed on a claim that DFI had breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by taking possession of a savings and 
loan purchased by the plaintiffs after DFI had 
issued net worth certificates to keep the sav-
ings and loan solvent. DFI had no express 
contractual obligation to continue to recognize 
the net worth certificates and the course of 
dealings between the plaintiffs and DFI did not 
reveal any obligation of or representations by 
DPI which would support the claim. Brown v. 
Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998). 
Summary judgment was properly entered for 
the defendant, a hospital, on claims by a staff 
physician that the hospital had violated its own 
bylaws during peer review and disciplinary 
proceedings against the plaintiff, as the hospi-
tal substantially complied with its contractual 
obligations under the bylaws, gave the plaintiff 
notice and an opportunity to be heard on all 
charges against the plaintiff, held hearings 
which the plaintiff attended and fully partici-
pated in, negotiated settlements with the plain-
tiff, and all decisions made during the proceed-
ings were made on record by the duly appointed 
disciplinary body. Brinton v. IHC Hosps., 973 
P.2d 956 (Utah 1998). 
Waiver of claims. 
Summary judgment was properly entered for 
the defendant on the plaintiff's claims that the 
defendant, a hospital, violated its own bylaws 
in peer review and disciplinary proceedings 
against the plaintiff by making certain proce-
dural errors, as the plaintiff waived the right to 
object by failing to make timely objections dur-
ing the review proceedings as the plaintiff was 
required to do. Brinton v. IHC Hosps., 973 P.2d 
956 (Utah 1998). 
—Contract terms. 
Only when contract terms are complete, 
clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted 
by the judge on a motion for summary judg-
ment. If the evidence as to the terms of an 
agreement is in conflict, the intent of the par-
ties as to the terms of the agreement is to be 
determined by the jury. Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986). 
—Deceit. 
Where defendants in an action in deceit 
based upon misrepresentation produced evi-
dence that pierced the allegations of the com-
plaint and the plaintiff did not controvert, ex-
plain or destroy that evidence by 
counteraffidavit or otherwise, the court would 
be justified in concluding that no genuine issue 
of fact was present and that summary judg-
ment should be rendered for the moving party. 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 
(1960). 
—Defamation. 
Public comments made by a county commis-
sioner about a real estate developer were not 
defamatory as a matter of law. as the state-
ments were made as part of a continuing and 
spirited political debate, the statements were 
made in response to the plaintiff's assertions of 
wrongdoing by the commissioner, there was no 
likelihood of damage to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion and the statements therefore could not 
sustain a defamatory meaning. Mast v. 
Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
Summary judgment was appropriate in def-
amation action where all the defendants denied 
plaintiffs allegation in affidavits contained in 
the record, because the burden then shifted to 
plaintiff "to provide some evidence, by affidavit 
or otherwise," to support the allegations of his 
complaint, which he failed to do. Brown v. 
Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, 18 P.3d 1137. 
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— Duty of care. 
Where the plaintiff did not know who con-
structed or installed the steps on the trailer 
where she suffered a fall, and plaintiffs counsel 
had no admissible evidence showing that the 
defendant had notice of the defective condition 
of the steps, there was no evidence to support 
her claim of defendant's responsibility, no gen-
uine issue of material fact, and the trial court 
correctly granted summary judgment to the 
defendant. Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, 
977 P.2d 1205. 
— Employee status. 
In the absence of some evidence showing that 
the Boy Scouts of America and the Great Salt 
Lake Council have the right to control the 
manner and method of conducting regular 
troop meetiongs. plaintiff failed to create a 
factual dispute as to whether the troop master/ 
defendant was an "employee" of these entities 
and summary judgment was properly granted. 
Glover ex rel. Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 
P.2d 1383 (Utah" 1996). 
— Federal law. 
Summary judgment was proper on a claim 
that federal law required a defendant to pro-
vide certified payroll records where the plain-
tiff/movant failed to specifically cite any au-
thority for such a requirement and the court 
concluded that, as a matter of law, it was the 
plaintiffs responsibility to produce the certified 
reports. ELM, Inc. v. *M.T. Enters., Inc., 968 
P.2d 861 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 
P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). 
— Fraud. 
Summary judgment in favor of defendants 
was appropriate on a claim for conspiracy to 
defraud based on the defendants' bringing a 
frivolous claim against the plaintiffs in a pre-
vious case, since frivolous actions are not fraud-
ulent and the plaintiffs offered no proof of any 
conspiracy bv any of the defendants. Gildea v. 
Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998). 
—Judicial immunity. 
A psychologist, appointed by the court to 
assist it in making a custody determination, 
performs a function integral to the judicial 
process and is therefore entitled to quasi-judi-
cial immunity. Claims against a court-ap-
pointed psychologist for negligently conducted 
court-appointed duties were therefore barred 
by immunity and were properly dismissed on a 
motion for summary judgment. Parker v. 
Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496 (Utah 1998). 
—Jurisdiction. 
Bare contention that Arizona court did not 
have jurisdiction, unsupported by any specifi-
cation of facts in support thereof, raised no 
question of fact so that entry of summary 
judgment according full faith and credit to the 
Arizona judgment was not error. Transamerica 
Title Ins. Co. v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 
2d 346. 471 P.2d 165 (1970). 
— Lease action. 
Trial court properly granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the lessor in a claim to recover 
the cost of replacing the roof on the leased 
property where the lease expressly provided 
that the lessee was responsible for maintaining 
and repairing the roof, and the court inter-
preted this language as requiring the lessee to 
replace the roof if that was necessary. SLW/ 
Utah, L.C. v. Griffiths, 967 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
— Misrepresentation. 
Summary judgment in favor of defendants 
was appropriate on a claim that a title insur-
ance company misrepresented to purchasers of 
a title search that a judgment lien was valid by 
the title company's excluding the lien from 
coverage under a proposed commitment for 
title insurance, as the judgment lien was on 
record at the time of the title search and the 
plaintiffs were not purchasing the title commit-
ment so they had no basis to rely on its con-
tents. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 
1265 (Utah 1998). 
— Negligence. 
Summary judgment for defendant was 
proper where pleadings and depositions 
showed no negligence or omission of duty of 
reasonable care. Long v. Smith Food King 
Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973). 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present ques-
tions of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder and 
it is only when the facts are undisputed and 
where but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn therefrom that such issues become ques-
tions of law appropriate for summary judg-
ment. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. 
Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
Although summary judgment may on occa-
sion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is 
appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiffs own evidence that he instructed 
his attorneys not to amend his statement and 
schedules precluded a finding that attorneys' 
negligence proximately caused the denial of 
plaintiff's discharge in bankruptcy, and thus 
grant of summary judgment to defendant was 
proper. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 
1996). 
— Proximate cause. 
Proximate cause issues can be decided as a 
matter of law when a determination of the facts 
falls on either of two opposite ends of a factual 
continuum: summary judgment is appropriate 
(i) when the facts are so clear that reasonable 
persons could not disagree about the underly-
ing facts or about the application of a legal 
standard to the facts, and (ii) when the proxi-
mate cause of an injury is left to speculation so 
that the claim fails as a matter of law. Harline 
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). 
— Res ipsa loquitur. 
Summary judgment was properly awarded 
defendant in an action where the plaintiff, a 
powder man, was injured when a cap and stick 
of dynamite of defendant's manufacture ex-
ploded as he placed them in a drilled hole, and 
there was no evidence as to how or why they 
exploded, none as to when or how either of 
them were manufactured, and none as to how 
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or by whom they had been handled or treated 
prior to their use, except as plaintiff himself 
handled them. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was not applicable under the circumstances 
recited. To apply it would be to impose absolute 
liability and insurability upon manufacturers 
of explosives and perhaps most any other com-
modity and would extend the fact or fiction of 
control necessary to invoke the doctrine to an 
unreasonable, impractical and unrealistic de-
cree. Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Co., 3 
Utah 2d 283, 282 P.2d 1044 (1955). 
Time for motion. 
Defendant violated this rule by moving for 
summary judgment only when the case was 
called for trial. Hein's Turkey Hatcheries Inc. v. 
Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 
470P.2d 257(1970). 
Writ ten s t a t e m e n t of g r o u n d s . 
Because a summary judgment motion can be 
denied for at least two reasons, either because 
judgment is not merited or because factual 
issues preclude a grant of summary judgment, 
a trial court decision denying summary judg-
ment should be expressed in a brief, written 
statement, identifying the grounds for denying 
summary judgment. Estate Landscape & Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Inasmuch as summary judgment is only ap-
propriate when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, the inclusion of 
the requirement in Rule 52(a) that the court 
shall issue a statement of the ground for its 
decision cannot bear upon the undisputed fac-
tual basis for the decision. Hence, it can only 
bear upon alternative theories of law that may 
applv to the facts. Nee rings v. Utah State Bar, 
817 P.2d 320 (1991). 
An important reason for inclusion of the 
requirement that the trial court state the 
ground for its decision in summary judgment 
cases is administrative in nature: to provide a 
ready basis for review on appeal. However, also 
from the administrative point of view, failure to 
state the grounds for its decision would not 
constitute reversible error. Rather, in an appro-
priate case, failure to do so may only justify 
remand to the trial court. Neerings v. Utah 
State Bar, 817 P2d 320 (1991). 
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Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 
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The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
and may advance it on the calendar. 
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this title. 
United States Railway Association loans for payment of obligations arising from claims subject 
to this chapter, see section 721 of this title. 
§ 5 1 . Liability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate or 
foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negli-
gence; employee defined 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between 
any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and 
Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or 
Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or 
Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to 
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such 
commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal 
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and 
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; 
and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for 
such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of 
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of 
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, 
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other 
equipment. 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee 
shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any 
way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set 
forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being 
employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as 
entitled to the benefits of this chapter. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65; Aug. 11, 1939, c. 685, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404.) 
Historical Note 
1939 Amendment Act Aug. If, 1939, added June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 [Uncon-
last par. defining employee. stitutional]. 
Short Title. The Act of Apr. 22, 1908, as 
amended, which comprises this chapter, is AP r- 5» 1910» c- 143, 36 Stat. 291. See see-
popularly known as the "Employers' Liability tions 56 and 59 of this title. 
Act". 
The following are also popularly known as *Ug- " ; 1 ' 3 9 ' c ««-« SJf .»««• te 
Employers' Liability Acts sections 51, 54, 56, and 60 of this title. 
§ 5 2 . Carriers in Territories or other possessions of United 
States 
Every common carrier by railroad in the Territories, the District of 
Columbia, the Panama Canal Zone, or other possessions of the United 
States shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is 
employed by such carrier in any of said jurisdictions, or, in case of the 
death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the 
benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; 
and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next 
of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in 
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due 
to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, 
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. 
(Apr, 22, 1908, c 149, § 2 , 35 Stat. 65.) 
§ 5 3 . Contributory negligence; diminution of damages 
In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such 
common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of 
this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or 
where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee 
may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, 
but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such 
employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common 
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the 
injury or death of such employee. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66.) 
§ 5 4 . Assumption of r isks of employment 
In any action brought against any common carrier under or b> vii tue of 
any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or 
the death of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have 
assumed the risks of his employment in any case where such injury or 
death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the 
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier; and no employee shall be 
held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the 
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety or 
employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § 4, 35 Stat. 66; Aug. 11, 1939, c. 685, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404.) 
Historical Note 
1939 Amendment. Act Aug. 11, 1939, insert- carrier; and no employee shall be held to hive 
ed "where such injury or death resulted in assumed the risks of his employment in UJT 
whole or in part from the negligence of any of case^ following "of his employment in, i i j 
the officers, agents, or employees of such case". 
§ 5 5 . Contract, rule, regulation, or device exempting from lia-
bility; set-off 
Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or 
intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself 
from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void: 
Provided, That in any action brought against any such common carrier 
under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such common 
carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any 
insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the 
injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or 
death for which said action was brought 
(Am, 22. 1908. c. 149 § 5, 35 Stat. 66.) 
§ 56, Actions; limitations; concurrent jurisdiction of courts 
No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced 
within three years from the day the cause of action accrued. 
Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the 
United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which 
the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business 
at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of 
the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the 
courts of the several States. 
§ l lu Duty or liability of common carriers and rights of em-
ployees under other acts not impaired 
Nothing in this chapter shall bt held In limit tht duU 01 habilitv ol 
common carriers or to impair the lights of their employees undei art) 
other Act or Acts of Congress. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § 8, 35 Stat. 66.) 
§ 5 9 . Survival of right of action of person injured 
Any right of action given by this chapter to a person suffering injury shall 
survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving 
widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then of 
such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent 
upon such employee, but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for 
the same injury. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § 9, as added Apr. 5, 1910, c. 113. b 2, ^ Stat 291) 
§ 60« Penalty lor suppression of voluntary information in I 
dent to accidents; separability of provisions 
Any contract, rule, regulation, or deuce whatsoever, the purpose, intent, 
or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier 
from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the 
facts incident to the injury or death of any employee, shall be void, and 
whoever, by threat, intimidation, order, rule, contract, regulation, or device 
whatsoever, shall attempt to prevent any person from furnishing voluntar-
ily such information to a person in interest, or whoever discharges or 
otherwise disciplines or attempts to discipline any employee for furnishing 
voluntarily such information to a person in interest, shall, upon conviction 
thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for 
not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, for each 
offense: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to void 
any contract, rule, or regulation with respect to any information contained 
in the files of the carrier, or other privileged or confidential reports. 
It any provision of this chapter is declared unconstitutional or the 
applicability thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the 
validity of the remainder of the chapter and the applicability of such 
provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, L. 149, § 10, as added Au|» 11, 1939, t. 685, § i, 53 Stat. 1404.) 
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>ral Railroad Administration, DOT §234.109 
eed with caution through the 
sing a t a speed not exceeding 15 
)8 per hour. Normal speed may be 
med after the locomotive has 
ed through the crossing. 
) If there is not an appropriately 
pped flagger or uniformed law en-
ement officer providing warning to 
w a y traffic a t the crossing, each 
n must stop before entering the 
jsing and permit a crewmember to 
nount to flag highway traffic to a 
x The locomotive may then proceed 
Dugh the crossing, and the flagging 
^member may reboard the loco-
bive before the remainder of the 
in proceeds through the crossing. 
1) A locomotive's audible warning 
ice shall be activated in accordance 
h railroad rules regarding the ap-
ach to a grade crossing. 
14.106 Partial activation. 
Jpon receipt of a credible report of a 
?tial activation, a railroad having 
in tenance responsibility for the 
rning: system shall promptly ini t iate 
orts to warn highway users and rail-
id employees a t the subject crossing 
the same manner as required for 
se activations (§234.107). 
34.107 False activation. 
Upon receipt of a credible report of a 
Ise activation, a railroad having 
stintenance responsibility for the 
ghway-rail grade crossing warning 
stem shall promptly init iate efforts 
warn highway users and railroad 
nployees a t the crossing by taking 
te following actions: 
(a) Prior to a t ra in 's arrival a t the 
•ossing, notify the train crew of the 
(port of false activation and notify 
ly other railroads operating over the 
^ossing; 
(b) Notify the law enforcement agen-
V having jurisdiction over the cross-
lg, or railroad police capable of re-
ponding and controlling vehicular 
raffic; and 
(c) Provide for alternative means of 
ctively warning highway users of ap-
roaching trains, consistent with the 
Dllowing requirements (see Appendix 
I for a summary chart of al ternative 
aeans of warning). 
(l)(i) If an appropriately equipped 
lagger is providing warning for each 
167-198 0—96 12 
direction of highway traffic, trains 
may proceed through the crossing a t 
normal speed. 
(ii) If a t least one uniformed law en-
forcement officer (including a railroad 
police officer) provides warning to 
highway traffic at the crossing, trains 
may proceed through the crossing a t 
normal speed. 
(2) If there is not an appropriately 
equipped flagger providing warning for 
each direction of highway traffic, or if 
there is not a t least one uniformed law 
enforcement officer providing warning, 
trains with the locomotive or cab car 
leading, may proceed with caution 
through the crossing a t a speed not ex-
ceeding 15 miles per hour. Normal 
speed may be resumed after the loco-
motive has passed through the cross-
ing. In the case of a shoving move, a 
crewmember shall be on the ground to 
flag the train through the crossing. 
(3) In lieu of complying with para-
graphs (c) (1) or (2) of this section, a 
railroad may temporarily take the 
warning system out of service if the 
railroad complies with all require-
ments of §234.105, "Activation failure." 
(d) A locomotive's audible warning 
device shall be activated in accordance 
with railroad rules regarding the ap 
proach to a grade crossing. 
§234.109 Recordkeeping. 
(a) Each railroad shall keep records 
pertaining to compliance with this sub-
part. Records may be kept on forms 
provided by the railroad or by elec-
tronic means. Each railroad shall keep 
the following information for each 
credible report of warning system mal-
function: 
(1) Location of crossing (by highway 
name and DOT/AAR Crossing Inventory 
Number); 
(2) Time and date of receipt by rail-
road of report of malfunction; 
(3) Actions taken by railroad prior to 
repair and reactivation of repaired sys-
tem; and 
(4) Time and date of repair. 
(b) Each railroad shall retain for at 
least one year (from the latest date of 
railroad activity in response to a credi-
ble report of malfunction) all records 
referred to in paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion. Records required to be kept shall 
be made available to FRA as provided 
Tab 5 
Brent O. Hatch (5715) 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801/363-6363 
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Wesley W. Hoyt, pro hac 
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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, 
and UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
^F CHARLES CULVER 
Case No. 020905849 
Judge k 
STATE OF TEXAS 
< ( U ' N I ' i C I !!•» 
CHARLES CULVER, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes anil sliilcs ;is hilKi ws: 
1. I am a railroad operations consultant. I am over 18 years of age, and I have personal 
knowledge of and am competent to testify about the following fk 
2. i 1| ttacl led hereto is a tin \t • and correct copy of a report I prepared with respect to the above-
captioned case. As stated therein, I reviewed photographs and other related materials that 
are listed in my report.. 
•i i J 
DATED this _ £ ^ l a y of / /• • °L,^004 
. (.. c s-v i £ J " \ L ^ L L. H' X <-,' ', 
CHARLES CULVER 
SUBSCRIBED \ fore me this i da mo/iO) 
\&A/Y\ U- KiAJLtLVlJ) 
, 2004. 
Notary Public in and for the State of Texas 
C- - * - ° 7 
My Commission Expires 
S053S& JEAN H. RULAND 
i*&b%*\ N<**yPuMic, Stole dlfens 
« • - » * - ' MyComnl98kjnBq*BS 
JUNE 4,2007 
Charles L. Culver & Associates 
Railroad Operations ( onsull;ilion 
413 Bay Ridge Drive, League City, Texas 77573 
Tel. (281) 334-3226 Fax (281) 538-3400 e-mail < c!ca@houston rr com ^ 
July 16,2003 
CLAYSON VS. UTAH RAILWAY 
NOTE: Numbers in paicnthesr inserted throughout report indicate item numbenpage 
number of reference. 
A. Assignment 
[n December 2002 I was contacted by attorney Robert Tramuto of the law firm Jones & 
3ranger, regarding a railroad accident involving a Utah Railway freight train and a railrt vnl 
employee. 
My opinions, provided in section F of this repon are based on my training and experience in 
the railroad industry, as well as a ic\ lew ol the \arious materials that I have listed under 
Section D of this report. 
B. Qualifications 
I am qualified as a designated supervisor of locomotive engineers, as well as a certified 
locomotive engineer. I am qualified as an instructor of trainmen and engineers through 
Union Pacific Railroad. I have testified in court regarding duties of engineers and 
conductors, air brake operation, event recorder data interpretation and railroad operai in 
general. My current Curriculum Vitae is attached. 
C. Scope of Assignment 
1. To provide consultation, n:\ ieui»f.» i cil itti dot iiinnil ind reference materials as 
listed under Section D. 
2. To focus on railroad operations as applicable to the circumstances of this incident. 
3. To provide opinions directed solely to the actions and duties of railroad operations 
personnel, railroad managers and dispatchers. 
D. Documents Reviewed 
1. Accident Reports 
2. Deposition of Rebecca Cook 
3. Deposition of Signal Maintainer Einor Paulson 
4. Deposition of Manager of Signal Maintenance Ron Nash 
5. Deposition of Conductor Steve Clifton 
6. Deposition of Director of Safety Steve (i /amanfals i. 
Cl.ns;;;: ; , ! Jl<ih K nh\A\ Page I 
7. Deposition of Engineer Chad Booth 
8. Deposition of Rhett Cook 
9. Deposition of Ralph E. Smith 
10 Deposition of Dispatcher Carl Steiger 
11. Deposition of EngolfDeros 
12. Deposition of Lewis Leatham 
13 UP Timetable 
14. UP Track Bulletins 
15. Dispatcher's Tape 
16. Lone Worker Permit 
17. Recorded Interview of Shane Clayson 
18. Locomotive Inspection Report 
19. Event Recorder Data from Locomotive M)0<> X MP 
20. Maps 
21. Photographs 
22. Deposition of Senior Manager of Signal Operations I env Miller 
23. Deposition of Signal Tech Paul Reinhard 
24. 49 Code of Federal Regulations 
25. General Code of Operating Rules 
E. Summary of Events 
On December 4, 2000 signal maintainer Shane Clayson was working on the 18th North 
grade crossing warning devices at the intersection of track 3 at about Milepost 785.4 on 
the Union Pacific Salt Lake Subdivision. As Mr. Clayson stood near a signal cabinet, 
then turned facing north, he was struck by Utah Railway train RUT311, approaching 
from the south. According to witness Rebecca Cook, Mr. Clayson was bent over, 
straddling the track with his back to the approaching train (2:23). Mr. Clayson was 
injured as a result of the incident. 
Opinions 
(Opinion 1.) 
The crew of train RUT311 should have been, but was not informed of the malfunctioning 
signals at the grade crossing at 17th North prior to reaching the location of the 
malfunction. 
As per the testimony of conductor Steve Clifton, the crew had not been informed of the 
signal malfunction at this crossing (5 17), and he had not received notice from the 
dispatcher that a signal maintainer was working in this area (5:43). 
Signal Operations and Manager of Signal Maintenance Ron Nash had notified Mr. 
Clayson of the malfunction of the signals at grade crossing 17th North at approximately 
10:30 to 11 00 AM on the day of the accident. However, according to the taped 
conversation between the dispatcher and the crew of RUT311, the train crew was notified 
of malfunctioning block signals at control points 786 and 787, but was not notified of the 
riavsnn vs. I Jtah Railwav: Page 2 
crossing signal malfunction between the signals at approximately MP 786.5, even though 
maintainer Clayson had informed the dispatcher of problems with the crossing as well as 
problems with signals at both ends of the crossing (18:11). Mr. Clayson had also 
informed his supervisor Ron Nash of the malfunction of the crossing signals (18:10). 
Because both Signal Operations and Manager of Signal Maintenance Ron Nash were 
aware of a problem with the crossing signals at grade crossing at 17th North (17:12), they 
were required to inform the dispatcher of this situation so that affected trains could be 
notified. Had the train crew been informed that the crossing signals were malfunctioning, 
they would have had a duty to stop and flag the crossing as per the following railroad rule 
and federal regulation, whereby the accident would likely have been avoided: 
GENERAL CODE OF OPERATING RULES 
6.32. Road Crossings 
6.32.2 Automatic Crossing Devices 
A. Automatic Warning Devices Malfunctioning 
Use the following table to properly complete movement over the crossing: 
1 Movement When Automatic Warning Devices Are Malfunctioning 
If 
1 Someone is not at the crossing to 
provide warning 
! Then 
Stop before occupying the crossing. 1 
After a crew member is on the 
ground at the crossing to warn 
highway traffic, proceed over the 
crossing on hand signals from that 
crew member... | 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
TITLE 49-TKANSPORTATION 
CHAPTER II-FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
PART 234-GRADE CROSSING SIGNAL SYSTEM SAFETY 
Subpart A-General 
Sec. 234.105 Activation failure. (XG Order required by UP) 
Upon receipt of a credible report of warning system malfunction involving an 
activation failure, a railroad having maintenance responsibility for the warning 
/"•l/n/e^n
 >re [Tt-jh Railu/av Paoe 1 
system shall promptly initiate efforts to warn highway users and railroad employees 
at the subject crossing by taking the following actions: 
(a) Prior to any trainfs arrival at the crossing, notify the train crew of the report 
of activation failure and notify any other railroads operating over the crossing; 
(b) Notify the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the crossing, or 
railroad police capable of responding and controlling vehicular traffic; and 
(c) Provide for alternative means of actively warning highway users of 
approaching trains, consistent with the following requirements (see appendix B for a 
summary chart of alternative means of warning): 
(l)(i) If an appropriately equipped flagger provides warning for each direction of 
highway traffic, trains may proceed through the crossing at normal speed. 
(ii) If at least one uniformed law enforcement officer (including a railroad police 
officer) provides warning to highway traffic at the crossing, trains may proceed 
through the crossing at normal speed. 
(2) If an appropriately equipped flagger provides warning for highway traffic, but 
there is not at least one flagger providing warning for each direction of highway 
traffic, trains may proceed with caution through the crossing at a speed not 
exceeding 15 miles per hour. Normal speed may be resumed after the locomotive has 
passed through the crossing. 
(3) If there is not an appropriately equipped flagger or uniformed law 
enforcement officer providing warning to highway traffic at the crossing, each train 
must stop before entering the crossing and permit a crewmember to dismount to 
flag highway traffic to a stop. The locomotive may then proceed through the 
crossing, and the flagging crewmember may reboard the locomotive before the 
remainder of the train proceeds through the crossing. 
(d) A locomotive's audible warning device shall be activated in accordance with 
railroad rules regarding the approach to a grade crossing. 
Sec. 234.107 False activation. (XH Order required by UP) 
Upon receipt of a credible report of a false activation, a railroad having 
maintenance responsibility for the highway-rail grade crossing warning system shall 
promptly initiate efforts to warn highway users and railroad employees at the 
crossing by taking the following actions: 
(a) Prior to a train's arrival at the crossing, notify the train crew of the report of 
false activation and notify any other railroads operating over the crossing; 
I I * « k D n J I u w , , . D o n o i 
(b) Notify the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the crossing, or 
railroad police capable of responding and controlling vehicular traffic; and 
(c) Provide for alternative means of actively warning highway users of 
approaching trains, consistent with the following requirements (see Appendix B for 
a summary chart of alternative means of warning). 
(l)(i) If an appropriately equipped flagger is providing warning for each direction 
of highway traffic, trains may proceed through the crossing at normal speed. 
(ii) If at least one uniformed law enforcement officer (including a railroad police 
officer) provides warning to highway traffic at the crossing, trains may proceed 
through the crossing at normal speed. 
(2) If there is not an appropriately equipped flagger providing warning for each 
direction of highway traffic, or if there is not at least one uniformed law 
enforcement officer providing warning, trains with the locomotive or cab car 
leading, may proceed with caution through the crossing at a speed not exceeding 15 
miles per hour. Normal speed may be resumed after the locomotive has passed 
through the crossing. In the case of a shoving move, a crewmember shall be on the 
ground to flag the train through the crossing. 
(3) In lieu of complying with paragraphs (c) (1) or (2) of this section, a railroad 
may temporarily take the warning system out of service if the railroad complies 
with all requirements of Sec. 234.105, "Activation failure.'1 
(d) A locomotive's audible warning device shall be activated in accordance with 
railroad rules regarding the approach to a grade crossing. 
(Opinion 2.) 
Based on the information that I have been provided, the locomotive's audible warning 
^device was not used as required to warn Mr. Clayson of the approaching train. 
There are different accounts regarding the sounding of the train horn at the time of the 
accident. The engineer and conductor testified that the horn was blown from the whistle 
board through the point of the accident, but witnesses near the accident site have 
indicated that the horn was either not blown at all, or not blown until the train had entered 
the crossing (2:1, 3, 5, 6, 11,13, 14, 15). 
Although crewmembers stated that the train's horn was blown, according to witness, no 
horn was heard as the train approached the crossing near where Mr. Clayson was working 
(2:25), (3:43, 44), (4:62). Because the event recorder of the train's lead unit did not 
record horn activation, there is no documentation to back up claims that the horn was 
blown. Having considered both accounts as to the sounding of the horn, I find the lack of 
an audible warning a more likely scenario, based on the accounts of witnesses near the 
scene of the accident. Moreover, Mr. Clayson was talking with signal supervisor Ron 
Nash Mr. via cell phone at the time of the incident, continuing this communication until 
the phone went dead, yet Mr. Nash, through his cell phone, heard no audible warning 
from the approaching train (4:62). 
When a train is approaching a public crossing, the audible warning is to be sounded as 
follows: 
GENERAL CODE OF OPERATING RULES 
5.8.2 Sounding Whistle 
The required whistle signals are illustrated by "o" for short sounds and 
"-"for longer sounds: 
1 Sound 
(11) - - o — 
I Indication 
Approaching public crossings at grade with 
engine in front, start not less than 1/4 mile 
before reaching crossing, if distance permits. If 
distance does not permit, start signal soon 
enough before the crossing to provide warning. 
Prolong or repeat signal until engine occupies 
crossing. 
The following federal regulation addresses the requirement of train RUT311 to operate its 
audible warning as the train approached Mr. Clayson. This regulation was violated. 
TITLE 49-TRANSPORTATION 
CHAPTER II-FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
[Revised as of October 1,2000] 
PART 214-RAILROAD WORKPLACE SAFETY 
Sec. 214.339 Audible warning from trains. 
Each railroad shall require that the locomotive whistle be sounded, 
and the locomotive bell be rung, by trains approaching roadway workers on or 
about the track. Such audible warning shall not substitute for on-track safety 
procedures prescribed in this part. 
Sec. 214.7 Definitions. 
Lone worker means an individual roadway worker who is not being afforded on-
track safety by another roadway worker, who is not a member 
of a roadway work group, and who is not engaged in a common task with another 
roadway worker. 
Roadway worker means any employee of a railroad, or of a contractor to a railroad, 
whose duties include inspection, construction, maintenance or repair of railroad 
track, bridges, roadway, signal and communication systems, electric traction 
systems, roadway facilities or roadway maintenance machinery on or near track or 
with the potential of fouling a track, and flagmen and watchmen/lookouts as defined 
in this section. 
When a pedestrian or railroad worker is in danger of being struck by an oncoming train, 
an emergency situation exists. When such an emergency exists, railroad rules require the 
following: 
GENERAL CODE OF OPERATING RULES 
5.8.2 Sounding Whistle 
Sound 
(1) Succession of short sounds 
Indication 
Use when an emergency exists, or persons or 
livestock are on the track. j 
(Opinion 3,) 
The train was not operated at the required speed for the conditions. 
The train crew was required to operate at Restricted Speed, prepared to stop within half 
the range of vision. However, the engineer did not stop as required, resulting in the 
\ impact with Mr. Clayson. 
According to the deposition testimony of dispatcher Carl Steiger (Pg. 65), the area where 
the incident took place was ".. .considered actually yard movements..." Mr. Steigler 
further states, "... Yard movements are governed by their own rules, and that's 20 MPH." 
I find no reference to "Yard Movements" in Railroad Operating Rules or Special 
Instructions. However, assuming that the dispatcher was referring to this area as being 
under the provisions of "Yard Limits/' because there were two trains operating in the 
same area within close proximity to one another, the following would apply, requiring 
trains to operate at his referenced maximum speed of 20 MPH (7:40-41). 
GENERAL CODE OF OPERATING RULES 
6.13 Yard Limits 
l~..~~~ ,,„ TT**k D o J U o u - P n o p 7 
Within yard limits, trains or engines are authorized to use the main track not 
protecting against other trains or engines. Engines must give way as soon as possible 
to trains as they approach. 
All movements entering or moving within yard limits must be made at restricted 







T ~ ^ 
Yard 
Limits 
Assuming that train RUT311 was operating under the provisions of Yard Limit Rule 
6.13, they were in violation of this rule by exceeding "Restricted Speed." 
Additionally, according to memorandum generated by Dale W. Hughes, dated 
12/11/2000, ".. .RUT311 was approaching (Mr. Clayson's) location from the south at 
restricted speed due to a signal problem north of the crossing (1:1)." Senior Manager of 
Signal Operations Terry Miller testified in his deposition that he had ".. .no reason to 
disagree with (the memorandum) (22:68)." 
6.27 Movement at Restricted Speed 
When a train or engine is required to move at restricted speed, movement 




• Railroad Car 
• Men or equipment fouling the track 
• Stop signal 
or 
• Derail or switch lined improperly 
The crew must keep a lookout for broken rail and not exceed 20 MPH. 
Comply with these requirements until the leading wheels reach a point 
where movement at restricted speed is no longer required. 
Had the train crew complied with Rule 6.27, prepared to stop within half the range of 
vision, short of "Men or equipment fouling the track," the accident most likely would not 
have occurred. 
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(Opinion 4.) 
/ Train dispatcher Carl Steiger did not properly perform his duties to inform train RUT311 
1
 of conditions ahead, issuing an XG Order*. 
In his deposition, Mr. Steiger testified that he has ".. .never done an XG Order." 
However, per the deposition testimony of Senior Manager of Signal Operations Terry 
Miller, an XG order is to be generated upon receipt of a report of a crossing malfunction 
in which the devices are not warning the public as intended (23:48). Because an XG 
Order requires a crewmember or a flagman to flag a crossing from the ground, had this 
precaution been taken, the accident most likely would not have occurred. 
*An XG Order requires a crewmember or a flagman to flag a crossing from the ground. 
(Opinion 5.) 
Shayne Clayson was not provided the training that he had requested in order to perform 
his duties in the safest manner. 
In the railroad industry, proper training is essential for safe work performance. Mr. 
Clayson had asked for additional training, but had not been provided that training, and 
was not assigned a co-worker to assist him with his duties in his new territory. Quoting 
from his interview of December 4, 2000: 
NO: At the end of that time, was there any concerns that you had taking over the 
territory or needing any additional help or anything that way? 
SC: I didn 7 know at that time, I, uh, I hadn V been in the Signal Department for the 
past 7 years so it was going to be a new experience for me. And I had never 
maintained before so I need, I was going to need a lot of help with me. 
Had Mr. Clayson been assigned a co-worker to assist him with this "new experience," 
this person could have helped in keeping a lookout for approaching train traffic. Keeping 
such a lookout is done routinely in the railroad industry where two or more persons are 
working together. Refer to the following: 
TITLE 49-TRANSPORTATION 
CHAPTER II-FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
[Revised as of October 1,2000] 
PART 214--RAILROAD WORKPLACE SAFETY 
Sec. 214.329 Train approach warning provided by watchmen/lookouts. 
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Roadway workers in a roadway work group who foul any track outside of 
working limits shall be given warning of approaching trains by one or more 
watchmen/lookouts in accordance with the following provisions: 
(a) Train approach warning shall be given in sufficient time to enable each 
roadway worker to move to and occupy a previously arranged place of safety not 
less than 15 seconds before a train moving at the maximum speed authorized on that 
track can pass the location of the roadway worker. 
(b) Watchmen/lookouts assigned to provide train approach warning shall devote 
full attention to detecting the approach of trains and communicating a warning 
thereof, and shall not be assigned any other duties while functioning as 
watchmen/lookouts. 
(c) The means used by a watchman/lookout to communicate a train approach 
warning shall be distinctive and shall clearly signify to all recipients of the warning 
that a train or other on-track equipment is approaching. 
(d) Every roadway worker who depends upon train approach warning for on-
track safety shall maintain a position that will enable him or her to receive a train 
approach warning communicated by a watchman/lookout at any time while on-
track safety is provided by train approach warning. 
(e) Watchmen/lookouts shall communicate train approach warnings by a means 
that does not require a warned employee to be looking in any particular direction at 
the time of the warning, and that can be detected by the warned employee 
regardless of noise or distraction of work. 
(f) Ever> roadway worker who is assigned the duties of a watchman/lookout shall 
first be trained, qualified and designated in writing by the employer to do so in 
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 214.349. 
(g) Every watchman/lookout shall be provided by the employer with the 
equipment necessary for compliance with the on-track safety duties which the 
watchman/lookout will perform. 
G. Conclusions 
These opinions, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, are based on the review 
of the materials listed, and the research completed at this time. They may be 
supplemented or revised upon receipt and review of additional data. 
I would also request an inspection of the lead unit involved in this accident, including a 
test of the horn, activated in a series of specific patterns, to be recorded by the event 
recorder that was installed at the time of the accident. Printouts of the results of these 
tests will be requested for review prior to the time of the trial in this matter. 
Charles L. Culver 
Clavson vs. Utah Railway: Page 10 
CURRICULUM VITAE (12/02) 
CHARLES L. CULVER 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS CONSULTANT 
Tel. (281) 334-3226 Fax (281) 538-3400 
E-Mail clca(5)houston.rr.com 
Web site www.culverassociates.com 
Charles L. Culver is a railroad operations 
consultant with expertise in train handling, 
rules interpretation, event recorder data 
interpretation, and railroad industry practice. 
Clients include both plaintiff and defense firms 
who seek assistance for incidents involving 
freight trains, passenger trains, and railroad 
employees, and, who represent major 
railroads, short lines, trucking firms, insurance 
companies and federal/state/local government. 
CONSULTATION/EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Deposition and Trial Testimony in Federal and District Courts in Litigation of Railroad 
Crossing Accidents, FELA, Derailments, Personal Injuries and Property Damage for 
Both Plaintiff and Defense Counsel 
Expert Testimony in Areas of Railroad Operations, Railroad Rules and Federal 
Regulations, Train Handling, Air Brake Operation, Event Recorder Data 
Interpretation and Industry Practice 
Special Focus on Train Handling and Crossing Evaluation from Operations 
Standpoint 
Special Focus on Inspections of Locomotives and Equipment, Railroad Yards and 
Other Accident Sites 
Accident Reconstruction Support through Interpretation of Event Recorder Data, 
Railroad Records and Documents and Execution of Software Based Train Event 
Simulators 
JCENSES, CERTIFICATIONS and QUALIFICATIONS 
> Federally licensed locomotive engineer 
Maintain Compliance with Code of Operations Rules, Scheduled Testing as Required for Operation of 
Trains in ABS, CTCt TWC and Dark Territories (1970- Present) 
> Designated Supervisor of Locomotive Engineers 
Charles Culver (12/2002) 
PanA 1 
Qualified via BNSF Academy of Railroad Sciences per requirements of 49CFR Part 240 As Follows: 
1. Knows and understands the requirements of this part; 
2. Can appropriately test and evaluate the knowledge and skills of locomotive engineers; 
3. Has the necessary supervisory experience to prescribe appropriate remedial action for any noted 
deficiencies in the training, knowledge, or skills of a person seeking to obtain or retain certification; 
and 
4. Is a certified engineer 
Qualified Instructor of General Code of Operating Rules 
Qualified Instructor of Air Brake and Signal Appliance Equipment 
Qualified Instructor of Safety and Radio Rules Pertaining to Operating Department 
Qualified in Hostler Certification (Brakemen/Conductors Certified to Operate 
Locomotives) 
Certified by Texas Safety Association as Operation Lifesaver Presenter 
AILROAD OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE 
25 Year Career with Union Pacific (Formerly Missouri Pacific) Railroad as 
Locomotive Fireman/Engineer, Handling All types of Freight, Yard, Passenger and 
simulator Equipment Under Various Terrain and Weather Conditions 
Technical Training Instructor for Union Pacific Railroad 
Locomotive Operation 
Hostler Certification Instruction 
Conductor Work Order Implementation 
ATCS On-Board Computer Operation 
Rules and Safety Training for Newly Hired Train Service Employees 
Instructed Supervisory Personnel in Rules, Safety, Train Handling, Field Efficiency 
Testing and Derailment Investigation (1997) 
Delegated by Missouri Pacific/Union Pacific for Special Assignments: 
Engineer Special Passenger Train for Railroad Tour for Upper Management Personnel of Dow 
and Monsanto Chemical Companies 
Liaison for Railroad to Consult with City, County and State Law Enforcement Agencies and City 
Government Officials Regarding Grade Crossing Safety 
Critical Incident Peer Support Program Representative 
Railroad Certified Operation Lifesaver Presenter with Focus in the Following Areas: 
Crossing Safety Programs for Trucking Companies 
Public Relations, Radio and Television PSA Production, Public Speaking 
Defensive Driving Classes 
Industrial and Corporate Safety Programs 
Presentations to Community Civic Groups 
Classroom Seminars in Schools throughout the State of Texas in Areas of Driver Education, Bus 
Driver Safety, Pre-Driving Age Students, and Pedestrian Safety 
FECIAL TRAINING 
Interpretation of event recorder (Black Box) data 
Certificate of Training-Burlington Northern/Santa Fe National Academy of Railroad 
Sciences-Locomotive Engineer Re-certification 
Charles Culver (12/2002) 
Certificate of Achievement for Advanced Engineer Training through Union Pacific 
(Simulator) 
Technical training in Code of Federal Regulations 49-Transportation (Railway 
Educational Bureau) 
Certificate of Training for Traffic Signalization, 3d Computer Visualization, and Injury 
Mechanism Analysis through Texas Association of Accident Reconstruction 
Specialists 
Certificate of Training from National Highway Institute- Highway-Rail Safety 
Improvement (FRA) 
Specialized Training-Managing Fatigue in Transportation (NTSB/NASA) 
Certificate of Training-Railroad Trespass Prevention and Border Issues 
(FRA/Operation Lifesaver) 
Technical Training in Basic Instruction for Brakemen/Switchmen (Railway 
Educational Bureau) 
Technical Training in Derailment Investigation Procedures (Railway Educational 
Bureau) 
Engineer Certification Seminar (American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association) 
3VANCED TRAINING/QUALIFICATIONS IN AIR BRAKE OPERATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
Certificate of Advanced Training in Freight Car Air Brake Equipment (Westinghouse 
Air Brake Company) 
Certificate of Advanced Training in Locomotive Air Brake and Electro-Pneumatic 
Equipment (Westinghouse Air Brake Company) 
Technical Training in Train Braking Distance Calculation (Railway Educational 
Bureau) 
Qualified as Instructor of Air Brake Rules and Operation through Union Pacific 
Technical Training Department 
MLROAD SAFETY AWARDS AND APPOINTMENTS 
Union Pacific Grade Crossing Safety Award (1994) 
Twenty Year Injury Free Service Award from Union Pacific (1990) 
Operation Lifesaver Special Achievement Award (1986) 
Safety Committee Chairman-Union Pacific Railroad (1983-1984) 
FECIAL PROJECTS 
Consultant/Advisor to U.S. Government Justice Dept/EPA in Matters of Railroad 
Safety 
Translated General Code of Operating Rules to Spanish for Use by Mexican 
Railroads 
Consolidated Timetables of Former Mexican National Railroad into Single Unit for 
Use in Privatized Operation 
Development, Coordination and Presentation of Training Programs for Railroad 
Management and Operating Personnel, Including Rules, Safety, Train Operation and 
Derailment Investigation (NARSCI) 
Charles Culver (12/2002) 
Hands-on Testing of Locomotive Handling, Signaling and Stopping Capabilities in 
Accident Reconstruction 
Train Crew Operations Auditing for Major Railroads and Short lines 
Participant- FRA Remote Control Locomotives Technical Conference 
Developed Operations/Training Manual for Industrial Railroad Operations 
FECIAL SKILLS 
Strong Ability to Express Railroad Terminology and Operations Scenarios in 
Laymen's Terms for Benefit of Jury 
Fluent in Spanish 
JBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
Certified Speaker for Texas Operation Lifesaver from 1985 Through Present 
Published: Event Recorder Evolution, Operation, and its Role in Railroad Accident 
Reconstruction (University of Tennessee, 1996) 
Presented: Post Accident Trauma and its Effect of Train Crews Involved in Railroad 
Accidents 
Presented: Operating Rules and Their Function in Railroad Operations-NARSCI 
Published: Certification of Railroad Operating Employees - What Has Been 
Accomplished and What Lies Ahead? (University of Tennessee, 2000) 
EMBERSHIPS 
Advisory Committee, National Association of Railroad Safety Consultants and 
Investigators 
The Air Brake Association 
International Association of Railway Operating Officers, Inc. 
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Charles L. Culver and Associates 
Railroad Operations Consultation 
413 Bayridge Drive, League City, Texas 77573 
Tel. (281)334-3226 Fax (281) 538-3400 F-Mail clca(S)houston.rr.com 
In compliance with RULE 26, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, the 
following will summarize my trial/deposition testimony during the past four years: 
February 5, 1999 - Deposition-Tugwell vs. NS 
February 19,1999 - Deposition-Olguin vs. Mitchell Energy & Development 
Corp., et al. and UPRR 
March 10,1999 - Trial testimony, Brumfield vs. Illinois Central/Amtrak 
May 4, 1999 - Deposition-Moore vs. KCS 
May 5,1999 - Deposition-Shaw vs. UP 
June 22,1999 - Deposition-Monohon vs. UP 
June 24,1999 - Deposition-Archer vs. UP 
July 20,1999 - Deposition-Dikes vs. Contrail 
September 14,1999 - Deposition-CSX vs. Plymouth 
September 20, 1999-Deposition-Mann vs. ATSF 
November 3,1999 - Deposition-Graumann vs. UP 
November 4,1999 - Deposition -Spence vs. UP 
November 22,1999 - Deposition -Kirby vs. Norfolk Southern 
January 10, 2000 - Deposition -Redding vs. BNSF 
March 2-3, 2000 - Trial Testimony - Mann vs. ATSF 
March 24, 2000-Deposition - Gintner vs. KCS 
April 7, 2000 - Trial Testimony - Denning vs. UP 
April 11, 2000 - Deposition -Nelson vs. Union Pacific 
April 26, 2000 - Deposition -Humphrey vs. Union pacific 
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July 14, 2000 - Deposition -Fluitt vs. Union Pacific 
July 26, 2000 - Deposition -Dugo vs. ATSF 
August 29, 2000 - Deposition -Dugo vs. 
September 25, 2000 - Deposition -Lee vs. Keokuk. Railway 
October 27, 2000 - Deposition - Fabe vs. Kansas City Southern 
November 16, 2000 - Deposition - Forsythe vs. Chance Rides, Inc. 
December 22, 2000 - Deposition - Urquidi vs. Union Pacific. 
January 2, 2001 - Deposition Escajeda vs. BNSF 
January 25, 26, 2001 - Trial Testimony - Mann vs. ATSF 
January 29, 2001 - Deposition Khemo vs. Amtrak 
March 15, 2001 - Deposition - Foutch vs. UP 
March 27, 2001 - Deposition - Simon vs. BNSF 
March 31, 2001 - Deposition- Powell vs. UP 
May 22, 2001 - Trial Testimony - Powell vs. UP 
May 29, 2001 - Deposition - Summers vs. UP 
June 19, 2001 - Deposition - VanHolt vs. Amtrak 
August 22, 2001 - Deposition - CSX vs. Tyson Foods 
August 24, 2001 - Deposition - Carson vs. UP 
September 5, 2001 - Deposition - Martinez vs. UP 
October 1, 2001 - Deposition - Lozenski vs. NS 
October 2, 2001 - Deposition - Robishaw vs. New England Central 
October 4, 2001 - Deposition - Dunn vs. BNSF 
November 20, 2001 - Deposition - Gabehart vs. Soo Line ; CP 
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December 11,2001 - Deposition - Giles vs. Kansas City Southern 
December 18, 2001 - Deposition - Barber vs. Union Pacific 
January 17, 2002 - Deposition - Staben vs. Amtrak/UP 
February 15, 2002 - Deposition - James Smith vs. Union Pacific 
March 1, 2002 - Deposition - Michael Smith vs. Union Pacific 
March 18, 2002 - Deposition- Doerrbecker vs. Roberson Logging 
March 19, 2002 - Trial Testimony - Michael Smith vs. Union Pacific 
April 10, 2002 - Deposition - Johnston vs. Union Pacific 
April 17, 2002 - Deposition - Lambert vs. Union Pacific 
April 19, 2002 - Deposition - Hammock Bros. vs. CSX 
April 25, 2002 - Deposition - Fite vs. KCS 
May 10, 2002 - Trial Testimony - Barber vs. Union Pacific 
May 14, 2002 - Deposition - Flores vs. Union Pacific 
May 17, 2002 - Deposition - Skelton vs. BNSF 
June 6, 2002 - Deposition - BNSF vs. Bellefontaine Quarry 
June 14, 2002 - Deposition - Millard vs. BNSF 
July 1, 2002 - Deposition - Glaviano vs. Union Pacific 
July 3, 2002 - Deposition - Trexel vs. Union Pacific 
July 24, 2002 - Deposition - Lee vs. New Jersey Transit 
August 13, 2002 - Deposition - Jesus Martinez vs. BNSF 
August 20, 2002 - Deposition - Martinez vs. Sacramento Rapid Transit 
August 23, 2002 - Deposition - Gonzales vs. BNSF 
August 26, 2002 - Deposition - Alexander vs. BNSF/UP 
Charles Culver (12/2002) 
September 12,2002 - Trial Testimony - Lee vs. New Jersey Transit 
September 13, 2002 - Deposition - Paz vs. KCS 
September 26, 2002 - Deposition - BNSF vs. Bellefontaine Quarry 
November 18, 2002 - Deposition - Moore vs. BNSF 
November 25, 2002 - Deposition - Royer vs. UP 
November 27, 2002 - Deposition - Sandoval vs. BNSF 
December 4, 2002 - Deposition - Jiron vs. BNSF/Amtrak 
December 9, 2002 - Deposition - Wiggins vs. UP 
December 12, 2002 - Deposition - Phillips vs. UP 
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CURRICULUM VITAE (10/00) 
CHARLES L. CULVER 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS CONSULTANT 
Tel. (281) 334-3226 Fax (281) 538-3400 E-Mail sculvera.iwl.net Web Site www.culverassociates.com 
LICENSES/CERTIFICATIONS/SPECIALIZED TRAINING 
• Qualified as Designated Supervisor of Locomotive Engineers through BNSF Academy of 
Railroad Sciences per Requirements of 49CFR Part 240 As Follows: 
1. Knows and understands the requirements of this part; 
2. Can appropriately test and evaluate the knowledge and skills of locomotive engineers; 
3. Has the necessary supervisory experience to prescribe appropriate remedial action for any 
noted deficiencies in the training, knowledge, or skills of a person seeking to obtain or retain 
certification; and 
4. Is a certified engineer. 
Licensed Locomotive Engineer (49CFR Part 240) 
• Certificate of Training-Burlington Northern/Santa Fe National Academy of Railroad 
Sciences-Locomotive Engineer Recertification 
Certificate of Achievement for Advanced Engineer Training Through Union Pacific (Simulator) 
• Technical Training in Code of Federal Regulations 49-Transportation (Railway Educational 
Bureau) 
Certificate of Training for Traffic Signalization, 3d Computer Visualization, and Injury 
Mechanism Analysis Through Texas Association of Accident Reconstruction Specialists 
Certificate of Training from National Highway Institute- Highway-Rail Safety Improvement 
(FRA) 
Specialized Training-Managing Fatigue in Transportation (NTSB/NASA) 
Specialized Training- Interpretation of Event Recorder (Black Box) Data 
Certified by Texas Safety Association as Operation Lifesaver Presenter 
Certificate of Training-Railroad Trespass Prevention and Border Issues (FRA/Operation 
Lifesaver) 
Technical Training in Basic Instruction for Brakemen/Switchmen (Railway Educational Bureau) 
Derailment Investigation Procedures Workshop (Railway Educational Bureau) 
Engineer Certification Seminar (American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association) 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE 
25 Year Career with Union Pacific (Formerly Missouri Pacific) Railroad as Locomotive 
Fireman/Engineer, Handling All Types of Freight, Yard, Passenger and Simulator Equipment 
Under Various Terrain and Weather Conditions 
Delegated by Missouri Pacific/Union Pacific for the Following Special Assignments: 
• Engineer Special Passenger Train for Railroad Tour for Upper Management Personnel of 
Dow and Monsanto Chemical Companies 
• Certified as Operation Lifesaver Presenter to Represent Railroad in the Following Areas: 
• Public Relations, Radio and Television PSA Production, Public Speaking 
• Crossing Safety Programs for Trucking Companies 
• Defensive Driving Classes 
• Industrial and Corporate Safety Programs 
• Presentations to Community Civic Groups 
• Classroom Seminars in Schools throughout the State of Texas in Areas of Driver 
Education, Bus Driver Safety, Pre-Driving Age Students, and Pedestrian Safety 
• Liaison for Railroad to Consult with City, County and State Law Enforcement Agencies and 
City Government Officials Regarding Grade Crossing Safety 
• Critical Incident Peer Support Program Representative 
• Technical Training Instructor for Union Pacific Railroad: 
• Locomotive Operation 
• Hostler Certification Instruction 
• Conductor Work Order Implementation 
• ATCS On-Board Computer Operation 
CURRICULUM VITAE (10/00) 
CHARLES L. CULVER 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS CONSULTANT 
• Rules and Safety Training for Newly Hired Train Service Employees 
• 1997-Instructed Supervisory Personnel in Rules, Safety, Train Handling, Field Efficiency 
Testing and Derailment Investigation 
CONSULTATION/EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
• Have Given Expert Testimony in Court in Areas of Railroad Operations, Railroad Rules and 
Federal Regulations, Train Handling, Air Brake Operation and Event Recorder Data 
Interpretation 
• Research and Tnal Testimony in Federal and District Courts in Litigation of Railroad Crossing 
Accidents, FELA, Derailments and Personal Injuries for Both Plaintiff and Defense Counsel 
Special Focus on Train Handling and Crossing Evaluation from Operations Standpoint 
Inspections of Locomotives and Equipment, Railroad Yards, and Other Accident Sites 
Assistance in Accident Reconstruction through Interpretation of Event Recorder Data, Railroad 
Records and Documents 
Computerized Train Braking Simulation 
ADVANCED TRAINING/QUALIFICATIONS IN AIR BRAKE OPERATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
Certificate of Advanced Training in Freight Car Air Brake Equipment (Westinghouse Air 
Brake Company) 
Certificate of Advanced Training in Locomotive Air Brake and Electro-Pneumatic 
Equipment (Westinghouse Air Brake Company) 
Technical Training in Modem Freight Car Air Brakes-FRA/AAR Rules (Railway Educational 
Bureau) 
Technical Training in Train Braking Distance Calculation (Railway Educational Bureau) 
Qualified as Instructor of Air Brake Rules and Operation through Union Pacific Technical 
Training Dept. 
RAILROAD SAFETY 
Union Pacific Grade Crossing Safety Award [1994] 
Twenty Year Injury Free Service Award from Union Pacific [1990] 
Operation Lifesaver Special Achievement Award [1986] 
Safety Committee Chairman-Union Pacific Railroad [1983-1984] 
RULES AND REGULATIONS INTERPRETATION 
Qualified Instructor of General Code of Operating Rules 
Qualified Instructor of Air Brake and Signal Appliance Equipment 
Qualified Instructor of Safety and Radio Rules Pertaining to Operating Department 
Qualified in Hostler Certification (Brakemen/Conductors Certified to Operate Locomotives) 
Have Developed Extensive Reference Library and Regularly Monitor FRA Code of Federal 
Regulations as Changes Occur 
1970-Present, Compliance with Code of Operating Rules, Scheduled Testing as Required 
• Operation of Trains in ABS, CTC, TWC and Dark Territories 
SPECIAL PROJECTS 
• Consultant/Advisor to U.S. Government Justice Dept/EPA in Matters of Railroad Safety 
Translated General Code of Operating Rules to Spanish for Use by Mexican Railroads 
Consolidated Timetables of Former Mexican National Railroad into Single Unit for Use in 
Privatized Operation 
Development, Coordination and Presentation of Training Programs for Railroad Management and 
Operating Personnel, Including Rules, Safety, Train Operation and Derailment Investigation 
CURRICULUM VITAE (10/00) 
CHARLES L. CULVER 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS CONSULTANT 
• Member of Train Handling Committee for Development of Accident Reconstruction Manual 
(NARSCI) 
• Hands-on Testing of Locomotive Handling, Signaling and Stopping Capabilities in Accident 
Reconstruction 
Train Crew Operations Auditing for Major Railroads 
Participant- FRA Remote Control Locomotives Technical Conference 
SPECIAL SKILLS 
Ability to Express Railroad Terminology and Explain Scenarios in Laymen's Terms for Benefit 
of Jury 
Second Language: Spanish 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
Certified Speaker for Texas Operation Lifesaver from 1985 Through Present 
Published: Event Recorder Evolution, Operation, and its Role in Railroad Accident 
Reconstruction (University of Tennessee, 1996) 
Presented: Post Accident Trauma and its Effect on Train Crews Involved in Railroad Accidents 
Operating Rules and Their Function in Railroad Operations-NARSCI 
• Published: Certification Of Railroad Operating Employees-What Has Been Accomplished, and 
What Lies Ahead? (University of Tennessee, 2000) 
MEMBERSHIPS 
Texas Association of Accident Reconstruction Specialists 
Advisory Committee, National Association of Railroad Safety Consultants and Investigators 
The Air Brake Association 
International Association of Railway Operating Officers, Inc. 
Charles L. Culver and Associates 
Railroad Operations Consultation 
413 Bavndge Drive, League Crtv, Texas 77573 
Tel. (281) 334-3226 Fax(281) 538-3400 E-Mail scul\erfliwlnel> 
In compliance with RULE 26. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, the following will summarize 
mv tnal/deposition testimony during the past four years 
August 05, 1994-Deposition-Santana vs. Missouri Pacific Railroad 
June 23, 1995-Deposition- Mrs. Patsy G. Owen vs. CSX Transportation: United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division: No. 193-CV-2138-
HTWr 
October 30, 1995-Deposition-Gary C Herman vs. Burlington Northern Railroad 
November 21, 1995-Deposition-Wilburn and Betty Ansley vs. Southern Pacific 
December 5-6, 1995 - Testimony in federal court, Northern District of Georgia-Mrs 
Patsy G. Owen vs. CSX Transportation- United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. No 193-CV-2138-HTW 
January 10, 1996 - Deposition-Raymond Espinoza, Jr vs Elgin Joliet & Eastern 
Railroad- Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois: No. 90 L 317 
January 31, 1996 - Deposition-Szafranski vs. Burlington Northern Railroad- United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado: No. 94-Z-2088 
March 6, 1996 - Deposition-Dynasty Trucking/Amtrak collision- Fifteenth Judicial 
District Court, Parish of Acadia, State of Louisiana. No. 66.668-1 
April 1, 1996 - Deposition-Lollar vs. Union Pacific Railroad- 118th Judicial District Court 
for the State of Texas, County of Ho ward No 95-06-3 7,726-CV 
May 22, 1996 - Deposition-Queen vs. Norfolk Southern- State Court of Fulton County, 
State of Georgia: No. 95VS100348G 
July 23, 1996 - Deposition-Durr vs. Conrail- Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division-
Gloucester County: No. L-000543-91 
August 22, 1996 - Deposition-Nelson vs. MoPac- United States District Court Eastern 
District of Louisiana: No. 95-1575 
August 27, 1996 - Deposition-Curtis vs. ATSF- District Court of Tarrant County, Texas: 
No. 141-155208-94 
October 11, 1996 - Deposition-Watson vs. Southern Pacific Transportation Company-
District Court of Jefferson County: No. B-149,759 
October 14, 1996 - Deposition-Darling vs. Conrail- United States District Court, 
Southern District of New York: No. 95 C V 9841 
October 18, 1996 - Deposition-DeBerge vs. Burlington Northern- Superior Court of the 
State of Washington, County of Snohomish No. 95-2-04886-1 
October 31, 1996 - Deposition-Kelly vs. Southern Pacific- District Court of El Paso 
County, Texas: No. 95-8900 
November 26, 1996 - Deposition-Hamilton vs. Union Pacific- United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado: No. 96-K-592 
January 9, 1997 - Testimony in district court Tarrant County, Texas, 141st Judicial 
District-Sondra Curtis vs. ATSF- District Court of Tarrant County, Texas: No. 141-
155208-94 
January 10, 1997 - Deposition-Butler vs. Union Pacific- Circuit Court for the City of St. 
Louis, State of Missouri: No. 942-01421 
January 17, 1997 - Deposition-Quails vs. Burlington Northern- United States District 
Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Jonesboro Division: No. J-C-95-67 
January 23, 1997 - Deposition-Miguez vs Southern Pacific- State of Louisiana, Parish of 
Lafayette, Fifteenth Judicial District Court: No 89-5361-D 
January 30, 1997 - Testimony in circuit court for the city of St. Louis, state of Missouri-
Butler vs. Union Pacific- Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri: No. 
942-01421 
May 7, 1997 - Testimony in Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Cloucester 
County-Peter Durr vs. Consoidated Rail Corporation- Superior Court of New Jersey Law 
Division-Gloucester County. No. L-000543-91 
July 15, 1997 - Deposition-Peterson vs.. Burlington Northern- District Court Northwest 
Judicial District Civil: No. 94-000947 
September 8, 1997 - Deposition-Watkins vs. Amtrak/Illinois Central- Twenty-First 
Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, State of Lousiana: No. 92-02894 
September 11, 1997 - Deposition-Houghton vs. Port Terminal Railway 
October 28, 1997 - Deposition-Harding vs. Union Pacific- Los Angeles County Superior 
Court 
November 5, 1997 - Testimony in District Court of Harris County, Texas-Houghton vs. 
Port Terminal Railway 
November 25, 1997 - Deposition-Landry vs. Southern Pacific- 16th Judicial District Court 
Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana: No. 80,518 A 
February 24, 1998 - Deposition-Foster vs. Union Pacific- District Court of Jefferson 
County, Texas, 60th Judicial District: No. B150434 
February 27, 1998 - Deposition-Long vs. Norfolk Southern- Circuit Court, City of St. 
Louis, State of Missouri: No. 952-09567 
March 5, 1998 - Deposition-Lambert vs. CSX- Court of Common Pleas, Huron County, 
Ohio: No. CVC-97-059 
May 5-6, 1998 - Deposition-Smith vs. CSX- Circuit Court for the County of Livingston, 
State of Michigan. No. 96-15482-NO 
June 23, 1998 - Deposition-Landry vs. SP- 16th Judicial District Court, St. Martin Parish, 
Louisiana: No. 56002 
June 24, 1998 - Deposition-Meissner vs BN/SF- District Court for the State of Idaho: 
No. 96-0490-N-EJL 
June 26, 1998 - Deposition-Lovett vs UP- United States District Court for the Western 
District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division: No 97-2036 
July 15, 1998 - Deposition-Ryan vs UP- District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, Galveston Division. No.G-97-419 
August 18, 1998 - Deposition-Campbell vs. UP- United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho: No. 97-0463-E-BLW 
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Spokane County: No. 96-2-00855-3 
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October 1, 1998 - Deposition-Stelly vs. SP- District Court of Jefferson County, Texas, 
58th Judicial District: No. A-l54,032 
October 7, 1998 - Deposition-Kocian vs. UP- District Court of Harris County, Texas: 
No. 96-50768 
November 9, 1998 - Deposition-Crouse vs Chapparal Steel- District Court, Ellis County, 
Texas, 40th Judicial District. No. 55636 
November 11, 1998 - Deposition-Larabee vs. ATSF- United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division: No G-97-723 
February 5, 1999 - Deposition-Tugwell vs NS- State Court of Bibb County, Georgia. 
No. 44607 
February 19, 1999 - Deposition- Olguin vs. Mitchell Energy & Development Corp., et al. 
and UPRR- District Court of Harris County, Texas, 129th Judicial District, No. 97-46921 
March 10, 1999 - Testimony in 21S T Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, State 
of Louisiana - Brumfield vs. Illinois Central/Amtrak 
May 4, 1999 - Deposition-Moore vs KCS- District Court of Hunt County, Texas, 196th 
Judicial District No 59,454 
May 5, 1999 - Deposition-Shaw vs. UP- District Court of Harris County, Texas, 189th 
Judicial District No 98-10769 
June 22, 1999 - Deposition-Monohon vs UP- District Court of Labette County, Kansas: 
No 98 C 27 OS 
June 24, 1999 - Deposition-Archer vs UP- United States District Court, District of 
Idaho: No. 498CV00222 
July 20, 1999 - Deposition-Dikes vs. Conrail- Circuit Court of Cook County, County, 
Law Division: No. 97 L 01614 
September 14, 1999 - Deposition-CSX vs. Plymouth: Civil Action No. 98-76315 (ED. 
Mich.) 
September 20, 1999 - Deposition-Mann vs ATSF: District Court of Tarrant County, 
Texas 342nd Judicial District 
November 3. 1999 - Deposition-Graumann vs. BN: District Court, State of North 
Dakota, Northeast Judicial District, Civil No. 98-C-2020 
November 4, 1999 - Deposition-Spence vs. UP: District Court of Canadian County, 
State of Oklahoma, Case No CF-97-01 
November 22, 1999 - Deposition- Kirby vs. Norfolk Southern, United States District 
Court, Northern District of Georgia, Case Number 1 98-CV 2939 
January 10, 2000 - Deposition- Redding vs BNSF, Circuit Court of the City of St Louis 
State of Missouri, Cause No 972-10046, Division 1 
March 2-3, 2000 - Trial Testimony - Mann vs. ATSF District Court of Tarrant County, 
Texas 342nd Judicial District 
March 24, 2000 - Deposition - Gintner vs KCS 
April 7, 2000 - Trial Testimony - Denning vs. UP: Circuit Court of the State of Oregon 
for the County of Baker, Case No 98663 
April 11, 2000 - Deposition - Nelson vs Union Pacific 
April 26, 2000 - Deposition - Humphrey vs. Union Pacific 
July 14, 2000 - Deposition - Fluitt vs Union Pacific 
July 26, 2000 - Deposition - Dugo vs ATSF - Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois 
County 95 L 10615 
August 29, 2000 - Deposition - Dugo vs ATSF - Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois 
County 95 L 10615 
September 25, 2000 - Deposition - Lee vs Keokuk Jet Railway -
October 27, 2000 - Deposition - Fabe vs Kansas City Southern 
November 16, 2000 - Deposition - Forsythe vs Chance Rides, Inc 




Site inspection: 185.00/hour 
Away from Home 
Trial: 350.00/hour 
Travel Time: 90.00/hour 
Travel Expenses 
Other Expenses 
Retainer is fully refundable, less 
charges for any amount of hourly work 
performed prior to refund. 
Includes phone consultation, meetings, 
document review, report preparation 
Billing in 15-minute increments 
Includes time spent on site 
4-hour minimum 
Minimum 1500 per day flat rate when 
held away from home 
Includes time spent giving (and waiting 
to give) deposition or trial testimony 
4 hour minimum 
Includes time spent traveling to/from 
site inspections, meetings, trial events 
No minimum 
All costs associated with travel are 
billed to client 
Refundable airfare tickets purchased 
unless otherwise requested by client 
With prior approval, costs associated 
with outside agency services are billed 
to client 
Charles Culver (12/2002) 
Tab 6 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
HARRIMAN DISPATCHING CENTER 
TRAIN DISPATCHER'S BULLETIN NO. 80 
December!, 1999 
ALL TRAIN DISPATCHERS: 
Subject: General cleanup of old Tram Dispatcher's Bulletins and change of verbal format when 
Requesting Automatic Crossing Device Protection. 
Item IXancel the following Train Dispatcher's Bulletins TDB #'$ 11, 18, 33, 35, 39, 43, 45, 47, 48, 53, 
and 57 
Item 2. Cancel Train Dispatcher's Bulletin No. 3 and change Rule 6.32.2 AUTOMATIC CROSSING 
DEVICES, in Instructions Governing Train Dispatchers and Control Operators to read: 
I When advised of a defective or malfunctioning automatic crossing warning device, the J 
j location must be immediately protected and reported to the signal technician. | 
When notified that an automatic crossing device is malfunctioning, the train dispatcher 
must: 
1. Obtain as much detailed information as possible about malfunction. 
2. Notify closely approaching trains of the malfunctioning crossing device, and instruct crew 
to be governed by Rtfte 6.32.2. 
3 Contact the Harriman Dispatching Center (HOC) crossing signal technician and be 
governed by the technician's instructions. 
(a) If signal technician requests a stop label per Rule 6.32.2: 
Issue the following track bulletin ^ m^MMm^lm^^ where software 
allows, use protective track label to prevent clearing signals into affected 
area. 
"AUTOMATIC CROSSING DEVICE NOT WORKING PROPERLY AT 
(location) PROTECT CROSSING UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED 
BY SIGNAL EMPLOYEE." 
If using protective track label, advise trains of location before allowing to 
enter affected area using same format as used for track bulletin. 
(b) If signal technician requests a 15 mph label per Rule 6.32.2: 
Issue the following track bulletin (High-Use format XH) or use protective 
track label to prevent clearing signals into affected area when software 
allows. 
44AUTOMATIC CROSSING DEVICE NOT WORKING PROPERLY AT 
(location). PROCEED NOT EXCEEDING 15 MPH UNTIL CROSSING 
OCCUPIED. STOP NOT REQUIRED" 
Train Dispatcher's Bulletin No. 80 Pace of 2 
If using protective track label, advise trains of location Defore allowing to 
enter affected area using same format as used for track bulletin 
4. Where tracK bulletin is used this information mav be transmitted verbally to commuter 
trains with engineer only in the cat, using the same wording as track bulletin. 
5 Protection must remain m place until notified by signal technician that crossing 
protection is restored to normal operation 
NOTE: Signal technician wilt notify local law enforcement 
William B. Hall 
Manager of Rules - HOC 
Train Dispatcher's Bulletin No. 80 Page of 2 
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1 A. At Point No. 4. And as the train came, 
2 he--he still was standing there. My husband I 
3 remember saying to me, Oh, my God, that guy just 
4 got hit. And as I looked, at that moment Shayne 
5 was in the air about halfway up the train cart. 
6 So if you're looking at the top of the train car, 
7 he was flying about halfway. His body was 
8 turning and hitting a cart, and then it turned 
9 again, and it just fell. Looked like somebody 
10 threw a rag on the ground, just flew. 
11 Q. Would you like to take a minute? Maybe 
12 have a drink of water. If you want to get up and 
13 walk around, it would be okay. 
14 A. I'm okay. Thanks. 
15 Q. So to the best of your recollection, do 
16 you believe that Mr.--that Shayne was actually in 
17 between the rails of the railroad track at the 
18 time he was hit? 
19 A. I believe he was standing over--like 
20 straddling one--one track. There was a track, and 
21 he was standing with his back faced toward the 
22 train. And he was straddled, so he had one leg 
23 on one side of the track. So he had his left leg 
24 in the middle of the tracks and his right leg to 
25 the right side of the track. 
T Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-085-2180 Toll Free: 877-+41-2180 Fax: 801-985-2181 
•Deposition of Rebecca .Cook, 2/6/03 25 
1 your husband and from the time that you arrived 
2 up until the time that Shayne was hit by the 
3 train at Point No. 5, did you hear the train 
4 horn? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you hear the train's bell? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Did you hear any warning given by the 
9 train of its approach to the intersection? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Do you believe that if the train had 
12 given a warning, audible signal of its approach to 
13 the intersection, that you would have heard it? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 MR. McGARVEY: Objection. 
16 You can answer. 
17 BY MR. HOYT: 
18 Q. Sometimes attorneys make objections, 
19 but it's okay to answer. 
20 A. Okay. 
21 Q. And your answer to that question was? 
22 A. Yes. I believe if the train would have 
23 sounded a horn, we would have heard it. 
24 Q. Okay. Did you notice, before he was 
25 struck, if Shayne had any equipment in his hands 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
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Deposition of Rhett Cook 2/6/03 16 
1 what would be the east rail? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. And you indicated that the train 
4 actually picked his body up and--
5 A. Yeah. 
6 Q. --moved it forward? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. And where did he land? 
9 A. He landed right here on the other side 
10 of the.track (indicating). 
11 Q. Would you draw a circle around that X 
12 and put a Number .7 next to it? 
13 A. (The witness complied.) 
14 Q. From the time that you got to the 
15 intersection and stopped up until the time that 
16 Mr. Shayne Clayson was hit at the intersection by 
17 the train, did you hear a train horn? 
18 A. I don't remember hearing a train horn. 
19 Q. Did you hear--did you hear the train 
20 bell, the ding, ding, ding, ding, ding bell? 
21 A. I could hear the bells from the 
22 (indicating)--
23 Q. T h e c r o s s g u a r d ? 
24 A. --the cross guard. They were 
25 constantly on going ding, ding, ding, you know. 
T Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
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Deposition of Ron Nash 2/4/03 59 
or--up to the point that it went dead, were you 
able to hear Shane? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Did you have any problems 
hearingShane? 
A. No . 
Q. And then did it all of a sudden just go 
b l a n k o r g o d e a d ? 
A. Yeah, it just made kind of a crackling 
noise and that was it. 
Q. Did you, were you and Shane talking up 
to the point that it went dead? 
A. From what I can remember, yes. 
Q. And what did you later learn was the 
cause for the phone to go dead? 
A. Well, I learned that a train had hit 
him. The electrician that was working in that 
area called me shortly after I hung up from, or, 
yeah, hung up after the call from Shane, and the 
phone rang and I thought it was Shane calling me 
back so I answered it. And it was the 
electrician saying that Ifd had a maintainer get 
h i t b y a t r a i n . 
Q. Was that, was it Einor Paulson who gave 
you a call? 
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Q. And did you hear that train coming? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. At any point prior to that, did you see 
that train coming? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Was the train blowing its horn? 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. Was--
MR. McGARVEY: Well, objection. Lack 
of foundation as to whether he knows whether it 
was blowing its horn or not. And you can ask him 
whether he heard a horn. 
BY MR. HOYT: 
Q. Well--
A. Did I hear a horn? 
Q. Did you hear a horn? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Approximately what is the distance 
between Point No. 1 and Point No. 3 on the 
diagram? 
A. Point No. 1 and Point No. 3? 
Q. Yes. 
MR. McGARVEY: Objection. Lack of 
foundation. It calls for speculation. But you 
can go ahead and answer if you can. 
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A.* No. 
Q. Did you, based on the tapes that we 
have in front of us that were pulled, it shows 
that your speed obtained 20 miles an hour. Would 
you have any reason to disagree with that? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And would that basically be your 
recollection of what you recall how fast you were 
going at the time? 
A. At the time of being talked by or . . . 
Q. No, because at the time that you were 
talked by, you were stopped, correct? 
A. Well, shortly after being talked by is 
that the speed you're talking? 
Q. Yes, sir that's what Ifm talking about. 
A. Seventeen to twenty, somewhere in that 
area . 
Q. And then once you're past the yellow 
block, did you deviate your speed any? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. And then what happens when you get to 
787? What are you supposed to do at that ppint? 
A. Stop. 
Q. A n d b e c a u s e i t ' s a r e d b l o c k ? 
A . Y e s . 
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Q. Now, if the dispatcher, then, knew that 
the signal was defective and knew that the signal 
at the 17th Street crossing was, in fact, 
defective and not working properly, didn't the 
dispatcher have a responsibility to notify the 
crew--your train crew that there was a defective 
signal and crossing? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. Okay. I mean, that's taking the safe 
course. 
A. Right. 
I have a question. 
Q. Sure. 
A. You keep calling it a signal. Are you 
talking about the crossing gates? 
Q. Ifm talking about the crossing gates. 
A. Not the signal signal? 
Q. That's correct. And I probably 
should — that ' s a good issue, because you have the 
signals at both ends, the block signals, and then 
you have the intermediate signal, and then you 
have your crossing arms and--
A. What we call flashers. 
Q. --flashers. Okay. Let's use the word 
flashers and cross arms. That way we're on the 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
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safety rules for failing to tell you that the 
warning devices at 17th North was--were 
malfunctioning? 
A.. If he knew, yes. 
Q. And of course, the Utah Railway 
operates under the general code of operating 
rules, do they not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Rule 1.1.1 is maintaining a safe 
course; isn't that correct? 
A. I don't know the numbers. Ifm not--
there's about a thousand rules in there. 
Q. But if--if the Rule 1.1.1 is the 
maintaining a safe course, it means that the 
safest course must be taken in any situation, 
correct? 
A. I suppose so. . 
Q. Now, when is the first time, then, 
that--let me start over. Let me move you back a 
little bit now and you've left the yard, you 
know, with your six loads and three empties. And 
you're proceeding toward Chevron. Do you come up 
to the block signal at 786? 
A. What do you mean do I come up to it? 
Q. In other words, you have to go through 
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1 Q. Okay. All right. I want to visit with 
2 you now about when there is a problem with a 
3 particular crossing or there is a -- where it may 
4 involve the safety of the general motoring public. 
5 What may be generated out of your office 
6 from a warning standpoint? 
7 A. Well, it depends on the report that we 
8 J receive. 
9 I Q. Explain. 
10 A. That would determine the action that we 
11 take. 
12 Q. All right. For instance, give me some 
13 examples. 
14 A. For instance, where you have a crossing 
15 that is reported that lights are flashing and the 
16 gates are down and there's no train movement in that 
17 area, then what we'll do is put an XH order on it, 
18 which is a 15-mile - an-hour, we'll notify the local 
19 law enforcement agency, we generate a ticket, of 
20 course, through all this, and we get a maintainer 
21 dispatched. 
22 Q. Okay. And what is your understanding of 
23 an XH order? What's the function of that? 
24 A. It's actually to reduce the speed to 
25 15 miles an hour if the speed exceeds beyond that on 
THOMAS & THOMAS COURT REPORTERS 
AND CERTIFIED LEGAL VIDEO. L _ T. - C 
T. MILLER - Direct (By MR. TRAMUTO) 46 
1 maximum authorized speed. 
2 Q. And it's -- is it also part of an XH order 
3 that the train crew run a restricted speed? 
4 A. No, restricted speed is different from a 
5 15-mile-an-hour order. 
6 Q. All right. And so it's your understanding 
7 that an XH order does not direct a crew to run at 
8 restricted speed; is that correct? 
9 A. 15 miles an hour at a crossing is 
10 completely different from actually the terminology 
11 of restricted speed. 
12 J 15-mile-an-hour order is basically telling 
13 the train crew that at this particular crossing they 
14 need to proceed at 15 miles per hour, not exceeding, 
15 and if conditions warrant, they may be travelling at 
16 less --' a lesser speed than 15 miles per hour. 
17 Q. Okay. And that's what an XH order is? 
18 A. That is correct. 
19 Q. Is that generated out of your office? 
20 A. If we are made aware of it . 
21 Q. Okay. And take me through the protocol. 
22 Let's say you're notified of the crossing arm as 
23 you - - let's use that example, crossing arms are 
24 down, lights are on but there's no train in the 
25 area. Would you necessarily on a regular basis 
THOMAS & THOMAS COURT REPORTERS 
AND CERTIFIED LEGAL VIDEO, L.L.C. 
T. MILLER - Direct (By MR. TRAMUTO) 47 
issue an XH order in that regard? 
A. Yes, we would. 
Q. All right. Take me through who you notify 
or how you place that XH order in effect. 
A. Well, we notify the dispatcher and of 
course give him the pertinent information as far as 
location and tell him that we need an XH, 
15-mile-an-hour, at this particular crossing. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Then we notify the local law enforcement 
agency of the condition that we have at this 
crossing. 
Q. And then how long is that XH order in 
force? 
A. The XH order is in force until the 
conditions are repaired. 
Q. And how is that XH order disseminated for 
the people in the field at that location? 
A. Well, actually that comes from the train 
dispatcher, and that's really out of my true field 
of expertise. 
Q. All right. But your office does generate 
the orders to begin with? 
A. Our office notifies the dispatcher of an 
XH if we are the first individual to be notified, 
THOMAS & THOMAS COURT REPORTERS 
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T. MILLER - Direct (By MR. TRAMUTO) 4 a 
1 and we're doing this all hypothetically --
2 Q. Sure. 
3 A. -- so we're saying that a public citizen 
4 calls in and reports that to us, then we notify the 
5 dispatcher to put an XH order, 15-mile- an-hour, at 
6 this particular crossing. 
7 Q. Okay. Now, is there also an XG order? 
8 A. There is. 
9 Q. Have you in the past generated XG orders? 
10 A. Yes, I have. 
11 Q. On one or many occasions? 
12 A. On many occasions. 
13 Q. Okay. And what are some of the conditions 
14 I just generically speaking that you would generate an 
15 XG order? 
16 A. An XG order would be generated if we 
17 received a report of a crossing malfunction to the 
18 degree of where the crossing may have been 
19 vandalized, the lights were shot out, so the 
20 J crossing is not actually warning the public as it is 
21 intended. 
22 Q. Would the location of a crossing, let's 
23 say if it's a heavily traveled crossing from the 
24 general public where you know there's a lot of 
25 activity there•d also be a factor in generating an 
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any interrelationship between 786, the 
intermediate, the switch--I mean the signals at 
the 17th North crossing and 787? 
MR. McGARVEY: Objection. Asked and 
answered. You can go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Is it — now give me that 
again. 
MR. TRAMUTO: Do you want to read that 
back? Can you read that back, please? 
(The last question was read.) 
THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. TRAMUTO: 
Q. Okay. When Shayne Clayson bidded a 
maintainer's job there at Grant Tower, did you 
have any kind of a training session or training 
program for him to introduce him to the tower? 
A. Well — oh, gee, I forget his name. The 
maintainer that had the job and he was still 
there, he was—I think Shayne went out with him 
for a week, I believer I'm not sure if it was 
longer than that, but I think it was a week. It 
could have been longer. And then he—that guy 
left to go to his job that he'd bid on. 
Q. Because of the complexity that's there 
at Grant Tower, is a week, in your opinion, long 
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enough to introduce a new maintainer to that 
system? 
A. Well, not really. I mean, you learn 
new things every day about that stuff over there. 
That's — that's-'there's a lot of little quirks 
over there you could run into. So I--Ifd say the 
guys are alw.ays learning over there, even the ones 
that's been around there for years. 
Q. Would it be fair to say, then, that a 
training period of more than a week would be 
advisable? 
A. Oh, I think so, yeah. 
Q. Do you think, from a safety standpoint, 
that training with an individual more than a week 
is indicated for safety purposes? 
A. Probably. 
Q. Did you ever work with Shayne from the 
time that he first bid on the position at Grant 
Tower to the time he was injured there at Grant 
Tower? 
A. At Grant Tower, I — I ' m sure I was 
around when we were working on switch machines and 
we were both there, I'm sure. I can't remember 
specifically. I'm pretty sure that I also worked 
with him at 17th North on the switches over on 
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